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Abstract
Managing unemployment is one of the key issues in social policies. Unemployment
insurance schemes are designed to cushion the financial and morale blow of loss of
job but also to encourage the unemployed to seek new jobs more pro-actively due
to the continuous reduction of benefit payments. In the present paper, a simple
model of unemployment insurance is proposed with a focus on optimality of the
individual’s entry to the scheme. The corresponding optimal stopping problem is
solved, and its similarity and differences with the perpetual American call option are
discussed. Beyond a purely financial point of view, we argue that in the actuarial
context the optimal decisions should take into account other possible preferences
through a suitable utility function. Some examples in this direction are worked out.
Keywords: insurance; unemployment; optimal stopping; geometric Brownian motion;
martingale; free-boundary problem; American call option; utility.
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1. Introduction
Assessing the risk in financial industries often aims at finding optimal choices in decision
making. In the insurance sector, optimality considerations are crucial primarily for the
insurers, who have to address monetary issues (such as how to price the insurance policy
so as not to run it at a loss but also to keep the product competitive) and time issues
(e.g., when to release the product to the market). Less studied but also important are
optimal decisions on behalf of the insured individuals, related to monetary issues (e.g.,
how profitable is taking up an insurance policy and the right portion of wealth to invest),
consumption decisions (e.g., whether to maximize or optimize own consumption), or time-
related decisions (such as when it is best to enter or exit an insurance scheme).
In this paper we focus on the particular type of products related to unemployment
insurance (UI), whereby an employed individual is covered against the risk of involuntary
unemployment (e.g., due to redundancy). Various UI systems are designed to help cushion
the financial (as well as morale) blow of loss of job and to encourage unemployed workers
to find a new job as early as possible in view of the continued reduction of benefits. The
∗ Corresponding author. E-mail: mmjsa@leeds.ac.uk
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protection is normally provided in the form of regular financial benefits (usually tax free)
payable after the insured individual becomes unemployed and until a new job is found, but
often only up to a certain maximum duration and with payments gradually decreasing over
time. Many countries have UI schemes in place [19, 25], often run and funded by the
governments, with contributions from employers and workers, but also by private insurance
companies [15]. For example, the governmental UI systems administered in France and
Belgium in the 1990s provided benefits decreasing with time according to a certain schedule;
the amount of the benefit was determined by the age of the worker, their final wage/salary,
the number of qualifying years in employment, family circumstances, etc.
In this work we introduce and analyse a simple UI model focusing on the optimal
time for the individual to join the scheme. Before setting out the model formally, let us
describe the situation in general terms. Consider an individual currently at work but who is
concerned about possible loss of job, which may be a genuine potential threat due to the
fluidity of the job market and the level of demand in this employment sector. To mitigate
this risk, the employer or the social services have an unemployment insurance scheme in
place, available to this person (perhaps after a certain qualifying period at work), which
upon payment of a one-off entry premium would guarantee to the insured a certain benefit
payment proportional to their final wage and determined by a specified declining benefit
schedule, until a new job is found (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1: A time chart of the unemployment insurance scheme. The horizontal axis shows
(continuous) time; the vertical axis indicates the pay rate (i.e., income receivable per unit
time). The origin t = 0 indicates the start of employment. Two pieces of a random path Xt
depict the dynamics of the individual’s wage whilst in employment. The individual joins the
UI scheme at entry time τ (by paying a premium P ). When the current job ends (at time
τ0 > τ), a benefit proportional to the final wage Xτ0 is payable according to a predefined
schedule (e.g., see Example 2.1), until a new job is found after the unemployment spell of
duration τ1.
The decision the individual is facing is when (rather than if ) to join the scheme. What
are the considerations being taken into account when contemplating such a decision? On
the one hand, delaying the entry may be a good idea in view of the monetary inflation over
time—since the entry premium is fixed, its actual value is decreasing with time. Also, it
may be reasonably expected that the wage is likely to grow with time (e.g., due to inflation
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but also as a reward for improved skills and experience), which may have a potential to
increase the total future benefit (which depends on the final wage). Last but not least, some
savings may be needed before paying the entry premium becomes financially affordable. On
the other hand, delaying the decision to join the insurance scheme is risky, as the individual
remains unprotected against loss of job, with its financial as well as morale impact.
Thus, there is a scope for optimizing the decision about the entry time—probably not
too early but also not too late. Apparently, such a decision should be based on the informa-
tion available to date, which of course includes the inflation rate and also the unemployment
and redeployment rates, all of which should, in principle, be available through the published
statistical data. Another crucial input for the decision-making is the individual’s wage as
a function of time. We prefer to have the situation where this is modelled as a random
process, the values of which may go up as well as down. This is the reason why we do
not consider salaries (which are in practice piecewise constant and unlikely to decrease),
and instead we are talking about wages, which are more responsive to supply and demand
and are also subject to “real-wage” adjustments (e.g., through the consumer price index,
CPI). Besides, loss of job is more likely in wage-based employments due to the fluidity of
the job market. For simplicity, we model the wage dynamics using a diffusion process called
geometric Brownian motion.1
To summarize, the optimization problem for our model aims to maximize the expected
net present value of the UI scheme by choosing an optimal entry time τ ∗. We will show
that this problem can be solved exactly by using the well-developed optimal stopping theory
[35, 36, 39]. It turns out that the answer is provided by the hitting time of a suitable
threshold b∗, that is, the first time τb∗ when the wage process Xt will reach this level. Since
the value of b∗ is not known in advance, this leads to solving a free-boundary problem for
the differential operator (generator) associated with the diffusion process (Xt). In fact, we
first conjecture the aforementioned structure of the solution and find the value b∗, and then
verify that this is indeed the true solution to the optimal stopping problem.
In the insurance literature, there has been much interest towards using optimality con-
siderations, including optimal stopping problems. From the standpoint of insurer seeking
to maximize their expected returns, the optimal stopping time may be interpreted as the
time to suspend the current trading if the situation is unfavourable, and to recalculate pre-
miums (see, e.g., [22, 24, 32] and further references therein). Insurance research has also
focused on optimality from the individual’s perspective. One important direction relevant
to the UI context was the investigation of the job seeking processes, especially when re-
turning from the unemployed status [4, 29, 43]. This was complemented by a more general
research exploring ways to optimize and improve the efficacy of the UI systems (also in
terms of reducing government expenditure), using incentives such as a decreasing bene-
fit throughout the unemployment spell, in conjunction with sanctions and workfare (see
[13, 17, 20, 26, 27], to cite but a few). A related strand of research is the study of opti-
mal retirement strategies in the presence of involuntary unemployment risks and borrowing
constraints [6, 7, 14, 21, 40].
To the best of our knowledge, optimal stopping problems in the UI context (such as
the optimal entry to / exit from a UI policy) have not received sufficient research attention.
This issue is important, because knowing the optimal entry strategies is likely to enhance
1For technical convenience, we choose to work with continuous-time models, but our ideas can also be
adapted to discrete time (which may be somewhat more natural, since the wage process is observed by the
individual on a weekly time scale).
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the motivation for individuals to join the UI scheme, thus ensuring better societal benefits
through the UI policies (see analysis and discussion in [37]). Knowledge of the optimal entry
time for insured individuals, which has impact on the amount and duration of benefits to
be claimed, will also help the insurers (both state and private) to optimize their financial
practices (see a discussion in [28]). Thus, our present work attempts to fill in the gap by
addressing the question of the optimal timing to join the UI scheme.
It is interesting to point out that our optimal stopping problem and its solution have
a lot in common with (but are not identical to) the well-known American call option in
financial mathematics, where the option holder has the right to exercise it at any time (i.e.,
to buy a certain stock at an agreed price), and the problem is to determine the best time to
do that, aiming to maximize the expected financial gain. However, unlike the American call
option setting based on purely financial objectives, the optimal stopping solution obtained
in our UI model is not entirely satisfactory from the individual’s point of view, because the
(optimal) waiting time τb∗ may be infinite with positive probability (at least for some values
of the parameters), and even if it is finite with probability one, the expected waiting time
may be very long.
Motivated by this observation, we argue that certain elements of utility should be added
to the analysis, aiming to quantify the individual’s “impatience” as a measure of purpose
and satisfaction. We suggest a few simple ideas of how utility might be accommodated
in the UI optimal stopping framework. Despite the simplicity of such examples, in most
cases they lead to much harder optimal stopping problems. Not attempting to solve these
problems in full generality, we confine ourselves to exploring suboptimal solutions in the class
of hitting times, which nonetheless provide useful insight into possible effects of inclusion
of utility into the optimal stopping context.
The general concept of utility in economics was strongly advocated in the classical
book by von Neumann and Morgenstern [33], whose aim was in particular to overcome
the idealistic assumption of a strictly rational behaviour of market agents.2 These ideas
were quickly adopted in insurance, dating back to Borch [3] and soon becoming part of
the insurance mainstream, culminating in the Expected Utility Theory (see a recent book
by Kaas et al. [23]) routinely used as a standard tool to price insurance products. In
particular, examples of use of utility in the UI analysis are ubiquitous (see, e.g., [1, 2,
13, 17, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28]). There have also been efforts to combine optimal stopping
and utility [5, 6, 18, 24, 32, 43]. However, all such examples were limited to using utility
functions to re-calculate wealth, while other important objectives and preferences such as
the desire to buy the policy or to reduce the waiting times have not been considered as yet,
as far as we can tell.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, our insurance model
is specified and the optimization problem is set up. In Section 3, the optimal stopping
problem is solved using a reduction to a suitable free boundary problem, including the iden-
tification of the critical threshold b∗. This is complemented in Section 4 by an elementary
derivation using explicit information about the distribution of the hitting times for the geo-
metric Brownian motion. Section 5 addresses various statistical issues and also provides a
numerical example illustrating the optimality of the critical threshold b∗. In Section 6, we
carry out the analysis of parametric dependence in our model upon two most significant ex-
ogenous parameters, the unemployment rate and the wage drift, and also give an economic
2Impact of individualistic (not always rational) perception in economics and financial markets is the
subject of the modern behavioural economics (see, e.g., a recent monograph [8]).
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interpretation thereof. In Section 7, we make a useful comparison of our problem and its
solution with the classical American call option, which leads us to the discussion of the
necessity of utility-based considerations in the optimal stopping context. Finally, Section 8
contains the summary discussion of our results, including suggestions for further work.
Notation. We use the standard notation a ∧ b := min{a, b}, a ∨ b := max{a, b}, and
a+ := a ∨ 0.
2. Optimal stopping problem
2.1. The model of unemployment insurance
Let us describe our model in more detail. Suppose that time t ≥ 0 is continuous and is
measured (in the units of weeks) starting from the beginning of the individual’s employment
We assume without loss of generality that the unemployment insurance policy is available
immediately (although in practice, a qualifying period at work would normally be required
for eligibility). Let Xt > 0 denote the individual’s wage (i.e., payment per week, paid in
arrears) as a function of time t ≥ 0, such that X0 = x. We treat X = (Xt, t ≥ 0)
as a random process defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P), where Ω is a
suitable sample space (e.g., consisting of all possible paths of (Xt)), the filtration (Ft)
is an increasing sequence of σ-algebras Ft ⊂ F , and P is a probability measure on the
measurable space (Ω,F) which determines the distribution of various random inputs in the
model, including (Xt). It is assumed that the process (Xt) is adapted to the filtration
(Ft), that is, Xt is Ft-measurable for each t ≥ 0. Intuitively, Ft is interpreted as the full
information available up to time t, and measurability of Xt with respect to Ft means that
this information includes knowledge of the values of the process Xt.
Furthermore, remembering that Xt is positive valued, we use for it a simple model of
geometric Brownian motion driven by the stochastic differential equation
dXt
Xt
= µ dt+ σdBt, X0 = x, (2.1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion (i.e., with mean zero, E(Bt) = 0, and variance
Var(Bt) = t, and with continuous sample paths), and µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are the drift and
volatility rates, respectively. The equation (2.1) is well known to have the explicit solution
(see, e.g., [39, Ch. III, §3a, p. 237])
Xt = x exp
{
(µ− 1
2
σ2) t+ σBt
}
(t ≥ 0). (2.2)
Note that
Ex(Xt) = xe
µt, Varx(Xt) = x
2e2µt
(
eσ
2t − 1), (2.3)
where Ex and Varx denote expectation and variance with respect to the distribution of Xt
given the initial value X0 = x.
Let us now specify the unemployment insurance scheme. An individual who is currently
employed may join the scheme by paying a fixed one-off premium P > 0 at the point
of entry. If and when the current employment ends (say, at time instant τ0), the benefit
proportional to the final wage Xτ0 is payable according to the benefit schedule h(s); that
is, the payout at time t ≥ τ0 is given by Xτ0h(t − τ0). However, the payment stops when
a new job is found after the unemployment spell of duration τ1. For simplicity, we assume
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that both τ0 and τ1 have exponential distribution (with parameters λ0 and λ1, respectively);
as mentioned in the Introduction, this guarantees a Markovian nature of the corresponding
transitions. These random times are also assumed to be statistically independent of the
process (Xt).
Possible transitions in the state space of our insurance model are shown in Fig. 2, where
symbols “0” and “1” encode the states of being employed and unemployed, respectively,
whereas suffixes “+” and “–” indicate whether insurance is in place or not. Note that all
transitions, except from 0– to 0+ (which is subject to optimal control based of observations
over the wage process (Xt)), occur in a Markovian fashion; that is, the holding times are
exponentially distributed (with parameters λ0 if in states 0– and 0+, or λ1 if in states 1–
and 1+).
✣✢
✤✜
0+ 1+✣✢
✤✜
0– 1–✣✢
✤✜
✣✢
✤✜
✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✠
✻
③
②
(τ < τ0)
(Xt) τ
λ0
λ1
λ0
(τ ≥ τ0)
λ1
Legend:
0 (employed)
1 (unemployed)
+ (with insurance)
– (without insurance)
Fig. 2: Schematic diagram of possible transitions in the unemployment insurance scheme.
Here, τ0 and τ1 are the (exponential) holding times in states 0 and 1, with parameters λ0
and λ1, respectively, whereas τ is the entry time (i.e., from state 0– to state 0+), which is
subject to optimal control based on observations over the wage process (Xt).
The individual’s decision about a suitable time to join the scheme is based on the
information available to date. In our model, this information encoded in the filtration (Ft)
is provided by ongoing observations over the wage process (Xt). Thus, admissible strategies
for choosing τ must be adapted to the filtration (Ft); namely, at any time instant t ≥ 0 it
should be possible to determine whether τ has occurred or not yet, given all the information
in Ft. In mathematical terms, this means that τ is a stopping time, whereby for any t ≥ 0
the event {τ > t} belongs to the σ-algebra Ft (see, e.g., [44, Ch.1, §3, p. 25]).
Remark 2.1. In general, a stopping time τ is allowed to take values in [0,∞] including ∞,
in which case waiting continues indefinitely and the decision to join the scheme is never
taken. In practice, it is desirable that the stopping time τ be finite almost surely (a.s.) (i.e.,
Px(τ <∞) = 1), but this may not always be the case (see Section 4.1).
2.2. Setting the optimal stopping problem
As was explained informally in the Introduction, there is a scope for optimizing the choice
of the entry time τ , where optimality is measured by maximizing the expected financial
gain from the scheme. Our next goal is to obtain an expression for the expected gain under
the contract. First of all, conditional on the final wage Xτ0 , the expected future benefit to
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be received under this insurance contract is given by
Xτ0 E
(∫ τ1
0
e−rs h(s) ds
)
= βXτ0 , (2.4)
where r is the inflation rate and
β :=
∫ ∞
0
λ1 e
−λ1tH(t) dt, H(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−rs h(s) ds. (2.5)
Note that the expectation in formula (2.4) is taken with respect to the (exponential)
random waiting time τ1 (with parameter λ1), and that the expression inside integration
involves discounting to the beginning of unemployment at time τ0.
Example 2.1. A specific example of the benefit schedule h(s) may be as follows,
h(s) =
{
h0 , 0 ≤ s ≤ s0,
h0 e
−δ(s−s0), s ≥ s0,
(2.6)
where 0 < h0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ s0 ≤ ∞ and δ > 0. Thus, the insured receives a certain fraction of
their final wage (i.e., h0Xτ0) for a grace period s0, after which the benefit is falling down
exponentially with rate δ. This example is motivated by the declining unemployment com-
pensation system in France [25].3 Having specified the schedule function, all calculations
can be done explicitly. In particular, the constant β in (2.4) is calculated from (2.5) as
β =
h0
(
1− e−(r+λ1)s0)
r + λ1
+
h0 e
−(r+λ1)s0
r + λ1 + δ
.
In the extreme cases s0 = 0 or s0 =∞, this expression simplifies to
β =

h0
λ1
(
1− r + δ
r + λ1 + δ
)
, s0 = 0,
h0
λ1
(
1− r
r + λ1
)
, s0 =∞.
Here, the first factor has a clear meaning as the product of pay per week (h0) and the
mean duration of the benefit payment (E(τ1) = 1/λ1), whereas the second factor takes
into account the discounting at rates r and δ.
Returning to the general case, if the contract is entered immediately (subject to the
payment of premium P ), then the net expected benefit discounted to the entry time t = 0
is given by the gain function
g(x) := Ex
(
e−rτ0βXτ0
)− P, (2.7)
3More specifically, according to the French UI system back in the 1990s (see [25, p. 8]), a worker
aged 50 or more, with eight months of insurable employment in the last twelve months, was entitled to
full benefits equal to 57.4% of the final wage payable for the first eight months, thereafter declining by
15% every four months; however, the payments continued for no longer than 21 months overall. This
leads to choosing the following numerical values in (2.6): h0 = 0.574, s0 = 8 (52/12)
.
= 34.7 (weeks)
and δ = −(3/52) ln (1− 0.15) .= 0.0094 = 0.94% (per week). The restriction of the benefit term by
21 (52/12) = 91 weeks can be taken into account in our model by adjusting the parameter λ1 from the
condition E(τ1) = 91, giving λ1
.
= 0.0110. A more conservative choice is to use a tail probability condition,
for example, P(τ1 > 91) = 0.10, yielding λ1 = − ln (0.10)/91 .= 0.0253 (with E(τ1) .= 39.5).
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where x = X0 is the starting wage and the symbol Ex now indicates expectation with respect
to both τ0 and Xτ0 . Recall that the random time τ0 is independent of the process (Xt) and
has the exponential distribution with parameter λ0. Using the total expectation formula
(see, e.g., [38, § II.7.4, Definition 3, p. 214, and Property G*, p. 216]) and substituting the
expression (2.3), the expectation in (2.7) is computed as follows,
Ex
(
e−rτ0Xτ0
)
= Ex
[
e−rτ0 Ex(Xτ0 |τ0)
]
= Ex
[
e−rτ0(xeµτ0)
]
= x
∫ ∞
0
e(µ−r)tλ0 e−λ0 tdt
=
λ0x
r + λ0 − µ. (2.8)
Thus, substituting (2.8) into (2.7) and denoting
r˜ := r + λ0, β1 :=
βλ0
r˜ − µ, (2.9)
the gain function is represented explicitly as
g(x) = β1x− P. (2.10)
Of course, the computation in (2.8) is only meaningful as long as
µ < r + λ0 = r˜. (2.11)
Assumption 2.1. In what follows, we always assume that the condition (2.11) is satisfied.
Remark 2.2. In real life applications, the wage growth rate µ is rather small (but may
be either positive or negative). It is unlikely to exceed the inflation rate r, but even if it
does, then it is hardly possible economically that it is greater than the combined inflation–
unemployment rate r˜ = r + λ0. Thus, the condition (2.11) is absolutely realistic.
To generalize the expression (2.10), consider a delayed entry time τ > 0 (tacitly as-
suming that τ < ∞). Discounting first to the entry time τ when the deduction of the
premium P is activated, and then further down to the initial time moment t = 0, yields
the expected net present value of the total gain as a function of the initial wage x,
eNPV(x; τ) := Ex
[
e−rτ
(
e−r(τ0−τ)βXτ0 − P
)
1{τ<τ0}
]
, (2.12)
where the expectation on the right now also includes averaging with respect to τ , which
is a functional of the path (Xt). Note that the indicator function under the expectation
specifies that the entry time τ must occur prior to τ0, for otherwise there will be no gain.
Remark 2.3. The notation (2.12) emphasizes that the expected net present value depends
on the specific entry time τ . As was intuitively explained in the Introduction, there is a scope
for optimizing the choice of τ , where optimality is measured by maximizing eNPV(x; τ).
Formula (2.12) indicates that the decision time τ has a finite (random) expiry date τ0
(using the terminology of financial options). However, the expectation in (2.12) involves
averaging with respect to τ0. Moreover, taking advantage of exponential distribution of τ0,
the expression (2.12) can be rewritten without any expiry date (i.e., as a perpetual option).
Lemma 2.1. The expected net present value defined by formula (2.12) can be expressed
in the form
eNPV(x; τ) = Ex
[
e−r˜τg(Xτ)1{τ<∞}
]
, (2.13)
where the function g(·) is defined in (2.7) and r˜ = r + λ0 (see (2.9)).
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Proof. Since the distribution of τ0 is exponential, the excess time τ˜0 := τ0−τ conditioned on
{τ < τ0} is again exponentially distributed (with the same parameter λ0) and independent
of τ . Hence, conditioning on τ (restricted to the event {τ < ∞}) and using the total
expectation formula as before [38, § II.7, Property G*, p. 216]), together with the (strong)
Markov property of the process (Xt), we get from (2.12)
eNPV(x; τ) = Ex
(
Ex
[
e−rτ (e−r(τ0−τ)βXτ0 − P )1{τ0>τ}
∣∣τ])
= Ex
(
e−rτ Ex
[
(e−r τ˜0βXτ+τ˜0 − P )
∣∣τ] · Ex[1{τ0>τ}∣∣τ])
= Ex
(
e−rτ EXτ
[
(e−r τ˜0βX˜τ˜0 − P )
] · Px(τ0 > τ |τ)), (2.14)
where X˜t := Xτ+t (t ≥ 0) is a shifted wage process starting at X˜0 = Xτ . Substituting
Px
(
τ0 > τ |τ
)
= e−λ0τ and recalling notation (2.7), formula (2.14) is reduced to (2.13).
Finally, without loss we can remove the indicator from the expression (2.13) by defining
the value of the random variable under expectation to be zero on the event {τ =∞}. This
definition is consistent with the limit at infinity. Indeed, observe using (2.2) and (2.8) that
e−r˜ tg(Xt) = e−r˜ t
(
β1x e
(µ−σ2/2)t+σBt − P
)
= β1x exp
{−t(r˜ − µ+ 1
2
σ2 + σ t−1Bt
)}− P e−r˜ t. (2.15)
Due to the condition (2.11), r˜ − µ + 1
2
σ2 > 1
2
σ2 > 0. In addition, by the (strong) law of
large numbers for the Brownian motion (see, e.g., [9, Exercise 6.4, p. 265] or [39, Ch. III,
§3b, p.246]),
lim
t→∞
t−1Bt = 0 (P-a.s.).
Thus, the limit of (2.15) as t→∞ is zero (Px-a.s.). Hence, the event {τ =∞} does not
contribute to the expectation (2.13), so that, substituting (2.8), we get
eNPV(x; τ) = Ex
[
e−r˜τg(Xτ)
]
. (2.16)
To summarize, identification of the optimal entry time τ = τ ∗, in the sense of maxi-
mizing the expected net present value eNPV(x; τ) as a function of strategy τ (see (2.16)),
is reduced to solving the following optimal stopping problem,
v(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τg(Xτ )
]
, (2.17)
where the function g(x) is given by (2.10) and the supremum is taken over the class of all
admissible stopping times τ (i.e., adapted to the filtration (Ft)). The supremum v(x) in
(2.17) is called the value function of the optimal stopping problem.
2.3. Allowing for mortality
The simple model of unemployment insurance set out in Section 2.1 can be easily extended
to include mortality. Following [31, pp. 399–401], suppose that the individual who contem-
plates taking out the unemployment insurance policy may die (say, at a random time τ2
from zero), independently of employment-related events and subject to a constant force of
mortality λ2. That is to say, given that the individual is alive at current age t ≥ 0, the
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residual lifetime τ2 − t is an independent random variable exponentially distributed with
parameter λ2,
P(τ2 − t > s | τ2 > t) = e−λ2 s (s ≥ 0).
The necessary modifications to the unemployment insurance model of Section 2.2 start
by adjusting the formula for the expected future benefit (see (2.4)). Assuming that death
does not occur prior to the time τ0 of losing the job (i.e., τ2 > τ0, so that τ˜2 := τ2 − τ0
is exponentially distributed with parameter λ2), the benefit payments cease at τ1∧ τ˜2 (i.e.,
when a new job is found or at death, whichever occurs first). Since τ1 and τ˜2 are independent
and both have exponential distributions, the random variable τ1 ∧ τ˜2 has the exponential
distribution with parameter λ1 + λ2. Hence, the constant β from (2.5) is now written as
β =
∫ ∞
0
(λ1 + λ2) e
−(λ1+λ2) tH(t) dt.
Next, we need to take into account the effect of death in service, that is, if τ2 ≤ τ0. To be
specific, it is reasonable to assume that the lump sum to be paid by the employer in this
case is proportional to the final wage, say a†Xτ2 . Then, separating the cases where death
occurs after or prior to loss of job, it is easy to see that the definition (2.7) of the gain
function (i.e., net expected benefit discounted to the policy entry time) takes the form
g(x) = Ex
(
e−rτ0βXτ01{τ0<τ2}
)
+ Ex
(
e−rτ0a†Xτ21{τ2≤τ0}
)− P. (2.18)
The first expectation in (2.18) is computed using conditioning on τ0 and the total
expectation formula (cf. (2.8)),
Ex
(
e−rτ0Xτ01{τ0<τ2}
)
= Ex
[
e−rτ0 Ex
(
Xτ01{τ0<τ2}
∣∣ τ0)]
= Ex
[
e−rτ0 Ex(Xτ0 | τ0) · Px(τ2 > τ0 | τ0)
]
= Ex
(
e−rτ0 xeµτ0 e−λ2τ0
)
= x
∫ ∞
0
e(µ−r−λ2)tλ0 e−λ0 tdt
=
λ0x
r + λ0 + λ2 − µ, (2.19)
where in the second line we used conditional independence of Xτ0 and τ2 given τ0. Similarly,
by conditioning on τ2 the second expectation in (2.18) is represented as
Ex
(
e−rτ0Xτ21{τ2≤τ0}
)
= Ex
[
Xτ2 Ex
(
e−rτ01{τ0≥τ2}
∣∣ τ2)]
= Ex
[
Xτ2
∫ ∞
τ2
e−rtλ0 e−λ0 tdt
]
=
λ0
r + λ0
Ex
(
Xτ2 e
−(r+λ0)τ2). (2.20)
Again conditioning on τ2, the last expectation is computed as follows,
Ex
(
Xτ2 e
−(r+λ0)τ2) = Ex[e−(r+λ0)τ2Ex(Xτ2 |τ2)]
= Ex
(
e−(r+λ0)τ2xeµτ2
)
= x
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ0−µ)tλ2 e−λ2 t dt
=
λ2x
r + λ0 + λ2 − µ. (2.21)
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Finally, substituting the expressions (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21) into the definition (2.18),
we obtain explicitly
g(x) =
λ0x
r + λ0 + λ2 − µ
(
β +
λ2a
†
r + λ0
)
− P.
This expression has the same form as (2.10) but with the parameters r˜ and β1 redefined
as follows (cf. (2.9)),
r˜ := r + λ0 + λ2, β1 :=
λ0
r˜ − µ
(
β +
λ2a
†
r + λ0
)
.
In addition, the inequality (2.11) of Assumption 2.1 is updated accordingly. Subject to this
reparameterization, all subsequent calculations leading to the optimal stopping problem
(2.17) remain unchanged.
For the sake of clarity and in order not to distract the reader by unnecessary techni-
calities, in the rest of the paper we adhere to the original version of the model (i.e., with
no mortality, λ2 = 0); however, see the discussion at the end of Section 6.4 indicating an
important regularizing role of mortality, helping to avoid undesirable inconsistencies of the
model at small unemployment rates λ0.
2.4. A priori properties of the value function
The next lemma shows that the optimal stopping problem (2.17) is well posed.
Lemma 2.2. The value function x 7→ v(x) of the optimal stopping problem (2.17) has
the following properties:
(i) v(0) = 0 and, moreover, v(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0;
(ii) v(x) <∞ for all x ≥ 0.
Proof. (i) If x = 0 then, due to (2.2), Xt ≡ 0 (P0-a.s.) and the stopping problem (2.17)
is reduced to
v(0) = sup
τ
E0(−P e−r˜τ ),
which has the obvious solution τ = ∞ (P0-a.s.), with the corresponding supremum value
v(0) = 0. Furthermore, by considering τ =∞ (Px-a.s.) it readily follows from (2.17) that
v(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0.
(ii) Recalling that µ < r˜ (see Assumption 2.1), observe that the process e−r˜ tXt is a
supermartingale; indeed, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t we have, using (2.2) and (2.3),
Ex
[
e−r˜ tXt |Fs
]
= e−r˜ tXsE
[
eσ(Bt−Bs)+(µ−
1
2
σ2)(t−s)]
= e−r˜ tXs eµ(t−s)
≤ e−r˜ sXs (Px-a.s.).
In particular,
Ex(e
−r˜ tXt) ≤ Ex(X0) = x.
Hence, by Doob’s optional sampling theorem for non-negative, right-continuous super-
martingales (see, e.g., [44, Theorem 8.18, pp.140–141]), for any stopping time τ we have
Ex(e
−r˜τXτ ) ≤ Ex(X0) = x,
and it follows that the supremum in (2.17) is finite.
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2.5. The optimal stopping rule
For the wage process (Xt), consider the hitting time τb of a threshold b ∈ R, defined by
τb := inf{t ≥ 0: Xt ≥ b} ∈ [0,∞].
(As usual, we make a convention that inf∅ = ∞.) Clearly, τb is a stopping time, that is,
{τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t ≥ 0. Since the process Xt has a.s.-continuous sample paths, on
the event {τb <∞} we have Xτb = b (Px-a.s.). As we will show, the optimal strategy for
the optimal stopping problem (2.17) is to wait until the random process Xt hits a certain
threshold b∗ (see Fig. 3). More precisely, the solution to (2.17) is provided by the following
stopping rule,
τ ∗ =
{
τb∗ if x ∈ [0, b∗],
0 if x ∈ [b∗,∞). (2.22)
That is to say, if x ≥ b∗ then one must stop and buy the policy immediately, or else wait
until the hitting time τb∗≥ 0 occurs and buy the policy then. (Of course, these two rules
coincide when x = b∗.) However, if it happens so that τb∗ = ∞, then, according to the
above rule, one must wait indefinitely and, therefore, never buy the policy.
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Fig. 3: Simulated wage process Xt (left) and Yt = lnXt (right) according to the geometric
Brownian motion model (2.2), with X0 = 346 (euros) and parameters µ = 0.0004 and
σ = 0.02 (see Example 5.2). The dashed horizontal line on the left plot indicates the
optimal threshold b∗ .= 352.37 (euros) first attained in this simulation at τ ∗= 54 (weeks).
The dashed line on the right plot shows the estimated drift of the log-transformed data
(see Section 5.2).
The specific value of the critical threshold b∗ is given by
b∗ =
Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) , (2.23)
where
q∗ =
1
σ2
(
−(µ− 1
2
σ2
)
+
√(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2r˜σ2
)
. (2.24)
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It is straightforward to check, using condition (2.11), that q∗ > 1 (see also Section 3.2).
Finally, the corresponding value function (2.17) is specified as
v(x) =
{
(β1b
∗ − P )
( x
b∗
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b∗],
β1x− P, x ∈ [b∗,∞).
(2.25)
Equivalently, substituting the expression (2.23), formula (2.25) is explicitly rewritten as
v(x) =

P
q∗ − 1
(
β1(q∗ − 1)x
Pq∗
)q∗
, 0 ≤ x ≤ Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) ,
β1x− P, x ≥ Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) .
(2.26)
In particular, the function x 7→ v(x) is strictly increasing for x ≥ 0, with v(0) = 0 (cf.
Lemma 2.2).
These results will be proved in Section 3.
2.6. Deterministic case
For orientation, it is useful to consider the simple baseline case σ = 0, where the random
process Xt (see (2.2)) degenerates to the deterministic function
Xt = xe
µt (t ≥ 0).
Hence, any stopping time τ is non-random, say τ = t, and the optimal stopping problem
(2.17) is reduced to
v(x) = sup
t≥0
[
e−r˜ t(β1xeµt − P )
]
. (2.27)
The problem (2.27) is easily solved, with the maximizer t∗ given by
t∗ = inf
{
t ≥ 0: xeµt ≥ b∗0
} ∈ [0,∞], (2.28)
where
b∗0 =

P r˜
β1(r˜ − µ) , µ > 0,
P
β1
, µ ≤ 0.
(2.29)
The expression (2.29) is consistent with the general formula (2.23), noting that, in the limit
as σ ↓ 0, the quantity (2.24) is reduced to (cf. (2.11))
q∗ =

r˜
µ
> 1, µ > 0,
∞, µ ≤ 0.
With this convention, it is easy to check that the value function (2.27) is given by the
general formula (2.25). In particular, if µ ≤ 0 and x < b∗0 then, according to (2.28),
t∗ =∞ and from (2.27) we get v(x) = 0; indeed, the function t 7→ xeµt is non-increasing,
so it never attains the required threshold b∗0 > x. In contrast, if x ≥ b∗0 then by (2.28)
t∗ = 0 (for any µ), and (2.27) readily yields v(x) = β1x− P .
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3. Solving the optimal stopping problem
The optimal stopping problem (2.17) involves two tasks: (i) evaluating the value function
v(x), and (ii) identifying the maximizer τ = τ ∗. A standard approach is to try and guess
the solution and then to verify that it is correct.
3.1. Guessing the solution
Let us look more closely at the nature of the value function v(x) that we are trying to
identify. Observe that by picking τ = 0 in (2.17) yields the lower estimate
v(x) ≥ g(x). (3.1)
Clearly, if v(x) > g(x) then we have not yet achieved the maximum payoff available, so
we should continue to wait. On the other hand, if v(x) = g(x) then the maximum has
been attained and we should stop. This motivates the definition of the two regions, C
(continuation) and S (stopping),
C := {x ≥ 0: v(x) > g(x)}, S := {x ≥ 0: v(x) ≤ g(x)}.
By virtue of the Markov property of the process Xt, the same argument can be propa-
gated to any time t ≥ 0, provided that stopping has not yet occurred. Namely, if Xt = x′
(and τ ≥ t) then the problem (2.17) is updated with the new (residual) stopping time
τ ′ = τ − t and with the initial value x replaced by x′.
Thus, it is natural to expect that the optimal strategy prescribes to continue as long as
the current wage value Xt belongs to the region C (i.e., v(Xt) > g(Xt)), but to stop when
Xt first enters the region S (i.e., v(Xt) ≤ g(Xt)). That is to say, the optimal stopping
time should be given by4
τ ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0: Xt ∈ S} = inf{t ≥ 0: v(Xt) ≤ g(Xt)} ∈ [0,∞]. (3.2)
To clarify the plausible structure of the stopping set S, recall (see the proof of Lemma
2.2(i)) that a zero value of the stopping problem (2.17) is achieved by simply using the
strategy τ ≡ ∞, that is, by never joining the scheme. Thus, if the initial wage X0 = x
is small (e.g., such that g(x) = β1x − P < 0) then, in order to secure a positive payoff,
we should wait for a sufficiently high wage Xt. This suggests that the stopping rule (3.2)
is reduced to the first hitting time for a certain set on the plane {(t, x) : t ≥ 0, x ≥ 0}.
Furthermore, noting that the definition (3.2) is time homogeneous, in that it does not
change in the course of time t, we also hypothesize the simplest situation whereby the
regions C and S are determined by a constant threshold y = b∗ > 0,
C = [0, b∗), S = [b∗,∞). (3.3)
In other words, the conjectural hitting boundary does not depend on time.
Hence, we are led to the reduced optimal stopping problem over the subclass of hitting
times,
u(x) = sup
b≥0
Ex
[
e−r˜τbg(Xτb)
]
. (3.4)
4This conclusion is in accord with the general optimal stopping theory [35, § II.2.2].
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In particular, formula (3.2) specializes to
τb∗ = inf{t ≥ 0: Xt ≥ b∗} = inf{t ≥ 0: u(Xt) ≤ g(Xt)} ∈ [0,∞]. (3.5)
Our first task is to identify the value function u(x) in (3.4) and the corresponding maximizer
b = b∗ by solving the corresponding free-boundary problem (Section 3.2). After that, we
will have to show that this solution is optimal in the general class of stopping times, that
is, u(x) = v(x) for all x ≥ 0 (Section 3.3).
3.2. Free-boundary problem
According to general theory of optimal stopping (see, e.g., [35, Ch. IV]), in the continuation
region C = [0, b) (see (3.3)) the value function u(x) from (3.4) must be harmonic with
respect to the underlying process X˜t generated byXt. More precisely, due to the discounting
exponential factor in the optimal stopping problem (3.4), the process X˜t is obtained from
Xt by independent killing (or discounting) with rate r˜ (see [35, §§ 5.4, 6.3]). Thus, if b is a
suitable threshold and τb is the corresponding hitting time, then for any x ≥ 0 the following
condition must hold,
Ex
[
e−r˜(τb∧t)u(Xτb∧t)
]
= u(x) (t ≥ 0). (3.6)
Note that the geometric Brownian motion Xt determined by the stochastic differential
equation (2.1) is a diffusion process with the infinitesimal generator
L := µx
d
dx
+ 1
2
σ2x2
d2
dx2
(x > 0). (3.7)
The generator of the killed process X˜t is then given by (see [35, § 6.3, p.127])
L˜ = L− r˜I, (3.8)
where I is the identity operator. Then the harmonicity condition (3.6) can be reduced to
the differential equation L˜u = 0, that is, Lu− r˜u = 0 (see (3.8)).
On the boundary x = b of the set C = [0, b), due to the stopping rule (3.5) we have
u(b) = g(b). Moreover, according to the smooth fit principle (see [35, §9.1]), we must
also satisfy the condition u′(b) = g′(b). Finally, in view of the equality v(0) = 0 (see
Lemma 2.2(i)), we add a Dirichlet boundary condition at zero, u(0+) = limx↓0 u(x) = 0.
Thus, we arrive at the following free-boundary problem,
Lu(x)− r˜u(x) = 0, x ∈ (0, b),
u(b) = g(b),
u′(b) = g′(b),
u(0+) = 0,
(3.9)
where both b > 0 and u(x) are unknown.
Substituting (2.10) and (3.7), the problem (3.9) is rewritten explicitly as
µxu′(x) + 1
2
σ2x2u′′(x)− r˜u(x) = 0, x ∈ (0, b),
u(b) = β1b− P,
u′(b) = β1,
u(0+) = 0.
(3.10)
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Let us look for a solution of (3.10) in the form u(x) = xq (x > 0), with a suitable parameter
q ∈ R. Then the differential equation in (3.10) yields
1
2
σ2q (q − 1) + µq − r˜ = 0. (3.11)
This quadratic equation has two distinct roots,
q1,2 =
1
σ2
(
−(µ− 1
2
σ2
)±√(µ− 1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2r˜σ2
)
,
where q2 < 0 < q1 = q∗ (see (2.24)). Also note that, due to the condition (2.11), the
left-hand side of (3.11) is negative at q = 1, therefore q1 > 1. Thus, the general solution
of the differential equation (3.10) is given by
u(x) = Axq1 +Bxq2 , x ∈ (0, b), (3.12)
with arbitrary constants A and B. But since q2 < 0, the condition u(0+) = 0 implies that
B = 0. Hence, (3.12) is reduced to u(x) = Axq1 ≡ Axq∗ (0 < x < b). Furthermore, the
boundary conditions in (3.10) yield{
Abq∗ = β1b− P,
Aq∗bq∗−1 = β1,
whence we find
A =
β1b− P
bq∗
, b =
Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) . (3.13)
Thus, the required solution to (3.10) is given by
u(x) =
(β1b− P )
(x
b
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b],
β1x− P, x ∈ [b,∞)
(3.14)
where the threshold b is defined in (3.13) and q∗ > 1 is the positive root of the equa-
tion (3.11), given explicitly by formula (2.24).
3.3. Verification of the found solution
Using (3.13) and (3.14), it is easy to see that
u(x) = g(x), x ∈ [b,∞),
u(x) > g(x), x ∈ [0, b), (3.15)
in accord with the heuristics outlined in Section 3.1 (see (3.3)). However, there is no
need to check that the function u(x) defined in (3.14) solves the reduced optimal stopping
problem (3.4), because we can prove directly that u(x) provides the solution to the original
optimal stopping problem (2.17), that is, u(x) = v(x) for all x ≥ 0.
Remark 3.1. Since u(0) = 0 by formula (3.14), and v(0) = 0 according to Lemma 2.2(i),
in what follows it suffices to assume that x > 0.
The proof of the claim above (commonly referred to as verification theorem) consists
of two parts.
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(i) Let us first show that u(x) ≥ v(x) (x > 0). If the map x 7→ u(x) was a C2-function
(i.e., with continuous second derivative), then the classical Itoˆ formula (see, e.g.,
[34, Theorem 4.1.2, p. 44]) applied to e−r˜ tu(Xt) would yield, on account of (2.1)
and (3.7),
e−r˜ tu(Xt) = u(x) +
∫ t
0
e−r˜s
(
Lu(Xs)− r˜u(Xs)
)
ds+Mt (Px-a.s.), (3.16)
where
Mt :=
∫ t
0
e−r˜su′(Xs) σXs dBs (t ≥ 0). (3.17)
However, for the function u(x) given by (3.14), its C2-smoothness breaks down at the
point x = b, where it is only C1. But u(x) is strictly convex on (0, b) (i.e., u′′(x) > 0)
and linear on (b,∞), and we can define the action Lu(x) at x = b by using the
one-sided second derivative, say,
u′′(b−) = Pq∗b−2. (3.18)
In this situation, a generalization of the Itoˆ formula holds, known as the Itoˆ–Meyer
formula (see [39, Ch. VIII, §2a, p.757]), which ensures that the representation (3.16)
is still valid.
Recall that by construction (see the differential equation in (3.9)), we have
Lu(x)− r˜u(x) = 0, x ∈ (0, b). (3.19)
Moreover, it is easy to check using (3.18) that the equality (3.19) also extends to
x = b. On the other hand, on account of the condition (2.11) and the definition of b
in (3.13), for x > b we get
Lu(x)− r˜u(x) = µβ1x− r˜ (β1x− P )
= β1x(µ− r˜) + r˜P
< β1b(µ− r˜) + r˜P
=
P (µq∗ − r˜)
q∗ − 1 < 0, (3.20)
because, due to the equation (3.11) and the inequality q∗ > 1,
µq∗ − r˜ = −12 σ2q∗(q∗ − 1) < 0.
Thus, combining (3.19) and (3.20) we obtain
Lu(x)− r˜u(x) ≤ 0 (x > 0). (3.21)
Substituting the inequality (3.21) into formula (3.16), we conclude that, for any x > 0
and all t ≥ 0,
u(x) +Mt ≥ e−r˜ tu(Xt) (Px-a.s.). (3.22)
According to formula (3.17), (Mt) is a continuous local martingale (see, e.g., [39,
Ch. II, §1c, p.101]). Let (τn) be a localizing sequence of bounded stopping times, so
that τn ↑ ∞ (Px-a.s.) and the stopped process (Mτn∧t) is a martingale, for each n ∈ N.
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Now, let τ be an arbitrary stopping time of (Xt). From (3.22) we get
u(x) +Mτn∧τ ≥ e−r˜(τn∧τ)u(Xτn∧τ )
≥ e−r˜(τn∧τ)g(Xτn∧τ ) (Px-a.s.), (3.23)
using that u(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ≥ 0 (see (3.15)). Taking expectation on both sides
of the inequality (3.23) gives
u(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−r˜(τn∧τ) g(Xτn∧τ )
]
, (3.24)
since by Doob’s optional sampling theorem (see, e.g., [44, Theorem 8.10, p.131])
Ex[Mτn∧τ ] = Ex[M0] = 0.
By Fatou’s lemma (see, e.g., [38, § II.6, Theorem 2(a), p.187]), from (3.24) it follows
u(x) ≥ Ex
[
lim inf
n→∞
e−r˜(τn∧τ) g(Xτn∧τ )
]
= Ex
[
e−r˜τ g(Xτ )
]
. (3.25)
Finally, taking in (3.25) the supremum over all stopping times τ , we obtain
u(x) ≥ sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τ g(Xτ)
]
= v(x) (x > 0),
as claimed.
(ii) Let us now prove the opposite inequality, u(x) ≤ v(x) (x > 0). According to (3.1)
and (3.15), we readily have u(x) = g(x) ≤ v(x) for x ∈ [b,+∞). Next, fix x ∈ (0, b)
and consider the representation (3.16) with t replaced by τn ∧ τb, where (τn) is the
localizing sequence of stopping times for (Mt) as before. Then, by virtue of the
identity (3.19) (which, as has been explained, is also true for x = b), it follows that
u(x) +Mτn∧τ = e
−r˜(τn∧τb)u(Xτn∧τb) (Px-a.s.). (3.26)
Similarly as above, taking expectation on both sides of the equality (3.26) and again
applying Doob’s optional sampling theorem to the martingale (Mτn∧t), we obtain
u(x) = Ex
[
e−r˜(τn∧τb)u(Xτn∧τb)
]
. (3.27)
Note that, for 0 < x < b, we have 0 ≤ u(x) ≤ u(b) and 0 ≤ Xτn∧τb ≤ b (Px-a.s.),
hence
0 ≤ e−r˜(τn∧τb)u(Xτn∧τb) ≤ u(b) (Px-a.s.).
Using that τn ↑ ∞, observe that, Px-a.s.,
lim
n→∞
e−r˜(τn∧τb)u(Xτn∧τb) = e
−r˜τbu(Xτb)1{τb<∞} + limn→∞
e−r˜τnu(Xτn)1{τb=∞}
= e−r˜τbu(b)1{τb<∞}, (3.28)
because Xτb = b on the event {τ < ∞}, while 0 ≤ u(Xτn) ≤ u(b) on the event
{τ = ∞}. Hence, letting n → ∞ in (3.27) and using the dominated convergence
theorem (see, e.g., [38, § II.6, Theorem 3, p.187]), we get, on account of (3.28),
u(x) = Ex
[
e−r˜τbu(b)1{τb<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−r˜τb g(b)1{τb<∞}
]
= Ex
[
e−r˜τb g(Xτb)1{τb<∞}
]
≤ v(x),
according to (2.17). That is, we have proved that u(x) ≤ v(x) for all 0 < x < b, as
required.
Thus, the proof of the verification theorem is complete.
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4. Elementary solution of the reduced problem
4.1. Distribution of the hitting time
In view of the formula (2.2), the hitting problem for the process Xt is reduced to that for
the Brownian motion with drift,
τb := inf{t ≥ 0: Xt = b} ≡ inf{t ≥ 0: Bt + µ˜t = b˜}, (4.1)
where
µ˜ =
µ− 1
2
σ2
σ
, b˜ =
1
σ
ln
b
x
. (4.2)
Suppose that x ≤ b, so that b˜ ≥ 0. The explicit expression for the Laplace transform of
the hitting time (4.1) is well known (see, e.g., [9, Exercises 6.29 and 6.31, p. 268] or [12,
Proposition 3.3.5, p. 61]).
Proposition 4.1. For x ≤ b and any θ > 0, set
Φx,b(θ) := Ex(e
−θτb) ≡ Ex
(
e−θτb 1{τb<∞}
)
. (4.3)
Then
Φx,b(θ) = exp
{
−b˜
(√
µ˜2 + 2θ − µ˜
)}
, θ > 0, (4.4)
where µ˜ and b˜ are defined in (4.2).
Substituting the expressions (4.2), the formula (4.4) is rewritten as
Φx,b(θ) =
(x
b
)q1(θ)
, θ > 0, (4.5)
where q1(θ) is given by (cf. (2.24))
q1(θ) =
1
σ2
(
−(µ− 1
2
σ2
)
+
√(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2θσ2
)
. (4.6)
As usual, it is straightforward to extract from the Laplace transform (4.3) some ex-
plicit information about the distribution of the hitting time τb. First, by the monotone
convergence theorem (see, e.g., [38, § II.6, Theorem 1(a), p.186] we have
lim
θ↓0
Φx,b(θ) = Ex(1{τb<∞}) = Px(τb <∞).
Hence, noting from (4.6) that
q1(0) =
0 if µ−
1
2
σ2 ≥ 0,
1− 2µ
σ2
if µ− 1
2
σ2 < 0,
(4.7)
we obtain
Px(τb <∞) =
(x
b
)q1(0)
=
 1, µ−
1
2
σ2 ≥ 0,(x
b
)1−2µ/σ2
, µ− 1
2
σ2 < 0.
(4.8)
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Remark 4.1. The result (4.8) shows that hitting the critical threshold b = b∗, as required
by the stopping rule, is only certain when the wage growth rate is large enough, µ ≥ 1
2
σ2.
Thus, the “dangerous” case is when µ < 1
2
σ2, whereby relying only on the optimal stopping
recipe may not be practical. This observation may serve as a germ of the idea to connect
the optimality problem in the insurance context with the notion of utility (cf. the discussion
in Section 7.1 below).
Via the Laplace transform Φx,b(θ), we can also obtain the mean hitting time Ex(τb) in
the case µ ≥ 1
2
σ2, where τb <∞ (Px-a.s.). Namely, again using the monotone convergence
theorem we have
lim
θ↓0
∂Φx,b(θ)
∂θ
= − lim
θ↓0
Ex
(
τb e
−θτb) = −Ex(τb).
Hence, differentiating formula (4.5) at θ = 0 and noting from (4.6) that q1(0) = 0
(cf. (4.7)) and
q′1(0) =

∞, µ = 1
2
σ2,
1
µ− 1
2
σ2
, µ > 1
2
σ2,
we get
Ex(τb) = − ln
(x
b
)(x
b
)q1(0)
q′1(0) =

∞, µ = 1
2
σ2,
ln(b/x)
µ− 1
2
σ2
, µ > 1
2
σ2.
(4.9)
4.2. Alternative derivation
An alternative (and more direct) method to derive the formulas (4.8) and (4.9) is based on
general theory of Markov processes by solving the suitable boundary value problems (see,
e.g., [34, §9]). Namely, the hitting probability pi(x) := Px(τb <∞) as a function of x > 0
satisfies the Dirichlet problem [34, §9.2]{
Lpi(x) = 0 (0 < x < b),
pi(b) = 1.
(4.10)
The differential equation in (4.10) reads
1
2
σ2x2pi′′(x) + µxpi′(x) = 0 (0 < x < b),
which is easily solved to give
pi(x) = c1x
1−2µ/σ2+ c2.
If 1 − 2µ/σ2 < 0 (i.e., µ − 1
2
σ2 > 0) then c1 = 0 (since pi(x) is bounded), and due to
the boundary condition pi(b) = 1 it follows that c2 = 1 and pi(x) ≡ 1. A similar argument
shows that pi(x) ≡ 1 in the case 1−2µ/σ2 = 0. Finally, if 1−2µ/σ2 > 0 then, noting that
pi(0) = 0, we conclude that c2 = 0 and, due to the boundary condition, c1 = b
−1+2µ/σ2.
Thus, formula (4.8) is proved.
Similarly, the mean hitting timem(x) := Ex(τb) (with µ− 12σ2 > 0) satisfies the Poisson
problem [34, §9.3] {
Lm(x) = −1 (0 < x < b),
m(b) = 0.
(4.11)
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As usual, to solve the problem (4.11), it is convenient to approximate it with a two-sided
boundary problem by adding an auxiliary Neumann (reflection) condition at ε > 0,
Lmε(x) = −1 (ε < x < b),
mε(b) = 0,
m′ε(ε) = 0,
(4.12)
and then taking the limit of mε(x) as ε ↓ 0. This procedure will produce the correct
solution m(x) since limε↓0 Px(τε <∞) = Px(τ0 <∞) = 0 (for any x > 0).
A particular solution to the inhomogeneous differential equation
1
2
σ2x2m′′ε(x) + µxm
′
ε(x) = −1 (ε < x < b)
can be sought in the form m0(x) = c0 ln x, which gives c0 = −1/(µ − 12σ2). Thus, the
general solution of (4.12) can be expressed as
mε(x) = − ln x
µ− 1
2
σ2
+ c1x
1−2µ/σ2 + c2. (4.13)
Now, using the boundary conditions in (4.12) it is straightforward to check that
lim
ε↓0
c1 = 0, lim
ε↓0
c2 =
ln b
µ− 1
2
σ2
.
Hence, from (4.13) we get
m(x) = lim
ε↓0
mε(x) =
ln (b/x)
µ− 1
2
σ2
,
which retrieves the result (4.9).
Remark 4.2. The same method applied to the killed process X˜t with generator L˜ = L− r˜I
(see (3.8)) provides a neat interpretation of the value function u(x) as given by (3.14).
Namely, rewrite the expectation in (3.4) (i.e., eNPV(x; τb)) in the form E˜x
[
g(X˜τb)
]
, where
E˜x denotes expectation with respect to the killed process (X˜t), and note that, for b ≥ 0,
E˜x
[
g(X˜τb)
]
=
{
g(b) P˜x(τb <∞), x ∈ [0, b],
g(x), x ∈ [b,∞).
In turn, the hitting probability p˜i(x) := P˜x(τb < ∞) can be easily found by solving the
corresponding Dirichlet problem (cf. (4.10)),{
L˜p˜i(x) = 0 (0 < x < b),
p˜i(b) = 1.
Indeed, repeating the calculations in Section 3.2, it is straightforward to get p˜i(x) = (x/b)q
∗
.
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4.3. Direct maximization
Using the results of the previous sections, we can easily solve the optimal stopping problem
(2.17), at least in the subclass of hitting times τ = τb (see (3.4)),
u(x) = sup
b≥0
eNPV(x; τb) = sup
b≥0
Ex
[
e−r˜τb(β1Xτb − P )
]
. (4.14)
Observe that if x ≥ b then τb = 0 andXτb = x (Px-a.s.), so that eNPV(x; τb) ≡ β1x−P
for all b ∈ [0, x]. Let now b ∈ [x,∞). As already noted, on the event {τb < ∞} we have
Xτb = b (Px-a.s.), hence, according to (2.17) and (4.5),
eNPV(x; τb) = (β1b− P )Ex
(
e−r˜τb
)
= (β1b− P )
(x
b
)q∗
(b ≥ x), (4.15)
where q∗ = q1(θ)|θ=r˜ (cf. (2.24) and (4.6)). It is straightforward to find the maximizer for
the function (4.15). Indeed, the condition (∂/∂b)eNPV(x; τb) ≥ 0, equivalent to
β1b
−q∗− q∗(β1b− P )b−q∗−1 ≥ 0,
holds for all b ∈ [0, b∗], where
b∗ =
Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) , (4.16)
which is the same optimal threshold as before (cf. (2.23)). Thus, the supremum of
eNPV(x; τb) over b ≥ x is attained at b = b∗ if x ≤ b∗ or at b = x if x ≥ b∗.
The corresponding value function u(x) is then calculated as (cf. (2.25))
u(x) =
{
(β1b
∗ − P )
( x
b∗
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b∗],
β1x− P, x ∈ [b∗,∞).
(4.17)
Finally, substituting (4.16) into (4.17), we obtain explicitly (cf. (2.26))
u(x) =

P
q∗ − 1
(
β1(q∗ − 1)x
Pq∗
)q∗
, 0 ≤ x ≤ Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) ,
β1x− P, x ≥ Pq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) .
(4.18)
5. Statistical issues and numerical illustration
5.1. Specifying the model parameters
From the practical point of view, in order to exercise the stopping rule (2.22) the individual
concerned needs to be able to compute the critical threshold b∗ expressed in (2.23), for which
the knowledge is required about β1 (defined in (2.9)) and therefore about the parameters
r, λ0, µ and β (see (2.5)); furthermore, to evaluate the quantity q∗ defined in (2.24), one
needs to estimate µ− 1
2
σ2 and σ2 itself. Specifically:
• The loss-of-job rate λ0 can be extracted from the publicly available data about the
mean length at work, which is theoretically given by E(τ0) = 1/λ0.
• Likewise, the inflation rate r is also in the public domain.
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• To specify the wage growth rate µ, a simple approach is just to set µ = r as a crude
version of a “tracking” rule. However, it may be possible that the individual’s wage
growth rate µ is, to some extent, stipulated by the job contract— for example, that it
must not exceed the inflation rate r by more than 1% per annum (applicable, e.g., to
civil servants) or, by contrast, that it must be no less than r minus 0.5% per annum
(more realistic in the private sector). In practical terms, this would often mean that
the actual growth rate µ is kept on the lowest predefined level.
• More generally, the wage growth rate µ can be estimated by observing the wage
process Xt. This can be implemented by first using regression analysis on Yt = lnXt
and estimating the regression line slope µ− 1
2
σ2 (see (2.2)). In addition, the volatility
σ2 can be estimated by using a suitable quadratic functional of the sample paths Yt.
• Finally, knowing the benefit schedule (which should be available through the insurance
policy’s terms and conditions), it is in principle possible to calculate, or at least
estimate the value β.
To summarize, certain estimation procedures need to be carried out along with the on-line
observation of the sample path (Xt). More details (most of which are quite standard) are
provided in the next two subsections.
5.2. Estimating the drift and volatility
Denote for short a := µ− 1
2
σ2. According to the geometric Brownian motion model (2.2),
we have
Yt := lnXt = ln x+ σBt + at, Y0 = ln x.
Suppose the process Xt is observed over the time interval t ∈ [0, T ] on a discrete-time grid
ti = iT/n (i = 0, . . . , n), and consider the consecutive increments
Zi := Yti − Yti−1 = σ(Bti −Bti−1) + a(ti − ti−1) (i = 1, . . . , n). (5.1)
Note that the increments of the Brownian motion in (5.1) are mutually independent and
have normal distribution with zero mean and variance ti− ti−1 = T/n, respectively. There-
fore, (Zi) is an independent random sample with normal marginal distributions,
Zi ∼ N
(
aT
n
,
σ2T
n
)
(i = 1, . . . , n).
Then, it is standard to estimate the parameters via the sample mean and sample variance,
aˆn :=
n
T
· Z¯ = Z1 + · · ·+ Zn
T
=
YT − Y0
T
, (5.2)
σˆ2n :=
n
T
· 1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(Zi − Z¯)2. (5.3)
These estimators are unbiased,
E(aˆn) = a = µ− 12σ2, E(σˆn2) = σ2,
with mean square errors
Var(aˆn) =
σ2
T
, Var(σˆ2n) =
2σ4
n− 1 .
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In turn, the parameter µ is estimated by
µˆn = aˆn +
1
2
σˆ2n,
with mean E(µˆn) = E(aˆn) +
1
2
E(σˆ2n) = a+
1
2
σ2 = µ and mean square error
Var(µˆn) = Var(aˆn) +
1
4
Var(σˆ2n) =
σ2
T
+
σ4
2(n− 1)
(due to independence of the estimators aˆn and σˆ
2
n).
Note that the estimator aˆn in (5.2) only employs the last observed value, YT ; in partic-
ular, its mean square error is not sensitive to the grid size ∆ti = T/n, and only tends to
zero with increasing observational horizon, T →∞. This makes the estimation of the drift
parameter a difficult in the sense that very long observations over Yt are required to achieve
an acceptable precision (see, e.g., [10, Example 2.1, p. 3]). For instance, let µ = 0.004 and
σ = 0.02 (per week), then a = 0.0038; if T = 25 (weeks) then the 95%-confidence bounds
for a are given by aˆ± 1.96 σ/√T = aˆ± 0.00784, so the margin of error is about twice as
big as the value of a itself. To reduce it, say to 0.5a, one needs T ≈ 425 (weeks), which
exemplifies slow convergence.
In contrast, the mean square error of the estimator σˆ2n in (5.3) tends to zero as n→∞,
with T fixed. Thus, estimation of the parameter σ2 can be made asymptotically precise.
A numerical example illustrating the estimation of µ and σ2 using simulated data will
be given at the end of Section 5.4. A brief discussion of practical choices of µ, based on
sensitivity analysis, is provided at the end of Section 6.3.
5.3. Hypothesis testing
In view of the drawback in the general solution of the optimal stopping problem in that
the stopping time τb∗ may be infinite, that is, Px(τb∗ = ∞) > 0 (which occurs when
a = µ − 1
2
σ2 < 0, see Section 4.1), a reasonable pragmatic approach to decision making
in our model may be based on testing the null hypothesis H0 : a ≥ 0 versus the alternative
H1 : a < 0 (at some intuitively acceptable significance level, e.g. α = 0.05). Namely, as
long as H0 remains tenable, one keeps waiting for the hitting time τb∗ to occur, but once
H0 has been rejected, it is reasonable to terminate waiting and buy the policy immediately.
The corresponding test is specified as follows. Again, suppose that the process Yt is
observed on a discrete time grid ti = iT/n, and set Zi = Yti − Yti−1 (i = 1, . . . , n).
Let z(α) be the upper α-quantile of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1), that is,
1 − Φ(z(α)) = α, where Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
−u2/2 du. Then the null hypothesis H0 : a ≥ 0
is to be rejected at significance level α whenever
Z1 + · · ·+ Zn ≤ inf
a≥0
{
aT − z(α)σ
√
T
}
,
that is,
YT − Y0 ≤ −z(α)σ
√
T . (5.4)
This test is uniformly most powerful among all tests with probability of error of type I not
exceeding α, that is, P(reject H0 |H0 true) ≤ α.
The normal test (5.4) assumes that the variance σ2 is known. As mentioned before,
this presents no real restriction if the process Yt is observable continuously (i.e., if the grid
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(ti) can be refined indefinitely). If this is not the case (e.g., because the wage process can
only be observed on the weekly basis) then the test (5.4) is replaced by the t-test,
YT − Y0 ≤ −tn−1(α) σˆ
√
T ,
where σˆ2 is the sample variance (see (5.3)) and tn−1(α) is the upper α-quantile of the
t-distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom.
In practice, the hypothesis testing is carried out sequentially (e.g., weekly) as the obser-
vational horizon T increases. The advantage of this approach is that the resulting stopping
time is finite with probability one (i.e., Px-a.s.); indeed, it is the minimum between the
optimal stopping time τb∗ (which is finite Px-a.s. under the null hypothesis H0 : a ≥ 0) and
the first time of rejecting H0 (which is finite Px-a.s. if H0 is false).
5.4. Numerical examples
To be specific, we use euro as the monetary unit. First of all, the value of the constant β,
which encapsulates information about the benefit schedule as well as the rate λ1 of finding
new job (see (2.5)), is chosen to be
β = 30.
Thus, the overall expected benefit payable over the lifetime of the policy (and projected to
the beginning of unemployment) is taken to be equal to 30 weekly wages; that is, if the
final wage is 400 (euro per week) then the total to be received is
400.00× 30 = 12 000.00 (euro).
Further, we set
λ0 = 0.01, r = 0.0004.
This means that the expected time until loss of job is 1/λ0 = 100 (weeks), that is, about
1 year and 11 months, whereas the annual inflation rate is
e(365/7)·0.0004 − 1 = 0.02107617 ≈ 2.11%,
which is quite realistic.
Next, we need to specify the premium P and the parameters of the wage process Xt,
First, choose the initial value x = X0 as
x = 346.00 (euro).
This is motivated by the French labour legislation, whereby the current minimum pay rate
is set as 9.88 euro per hour [42], with a 35-hour workweek [11, 16], giving
9.88× 35 = 345.80 (euro per week).
As for the premium, it is set at the value
P = 9 000.00 (euro),
which equates to about 26 minimum weekly wages (i.e., income over about half a year).
For simplicity, we also choose
µ = r = 0.0004, (5.5)
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so that the wage growth rate is the same as inflation r (in reality, it could be slightly less).
Then from (2.9), using (5.5), we get
β1 =
λ0β
r˜ − µ = β = 30.
For the volatility σ, we will illustrate two opposite cases, µ < 1
2
σ2 and µ > 1
2
σ2.
Example 5.1. Set σ = 0.04, then µ − 1
2
σ2 = −0.0004 < 0. From (2.24) we calculate
q∗ = 3.864208, then (3.13) yields
b∗ = 404.7410 = 404.74 (euro).
Using (4.8), the hitting probability is calculated as
Px(τb∗ <∞) = 0.9245906.
Finally, using (3.14), we obtain the value of this contract,
v(346) = 1714.2780 = 1714.28 (euro).
Example 5.2. Now, set σ = 0.02, then µ− 1
2
σ2 = 0.0002 > 0. Furthermore, using (2.24)
we calculate q∗ = 6.728416, and from (3.13)
b∗ = 352.3705 = 352.37 (euro).
Hence, using (4.9), the expected hitting time is found to be
E(τb∗) = 91.22197 = 91.2 (weeks).
Finally, according to formula (2.25), the value of this contract is calculated as
v(346) = 1389.6190 = 1389.62 (euro).
In the simulation of the process Xt shown in Fig. 3, the drift a = µ− 12σ2 is estimated
using formula (5.2) as aˆ
.
= 0.0005994. Estimation of the variance σ2 according to formula
(5.3) (on a weekly time grid) gives σˆ2
.
= 0.0003723, while the true value is σ2 = 0.0004.
Hence, the parameter µ is estimated by µˆ
.
= 0.0007855; recall that the true value is
µ = 0.0004.
6. Parametric dependencies
In this section, we aim to explore the parametric dependencies of the solution of our
insurance problem, that is, of the optimal threshold b∗ given by (2.23) and the value function
v = v(x) given by (2.25). In particular, it is helpful to analyse different asymptotic regimes
as well as (the sign of) appropriate partial derivatives, so as to ascertain the direction of
changes under small perturbations and to understand their economic meaning. This is a key
ingredient of sensitivity analysis and of the so-called comparative statics [30, Section VII].
In what follows, we confine ourselves to a discussion of the two most important exoge-
nous parameters— the wage drift µ and the unemployment rate λ0. The constraint (2.11)
implies that the range of the parameters µ and λ0 is specified as follows,
−∞ < µ < r˜ = r + λ0, 0 ∨ (µ− r) < λ0 <∞.
Remark 6.1. The next two technical subsections are elementary but rather tedious, and the
reader wishing to grasp the results quickly may just inspect the plots in Figs. 4 and 5.
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6.1. Monotonicity
By virtue of the quadratic equation (3.11), the formula (2.23) can be conveniently rewritten
as
b∗ =
P (1
2
σ2q∗+ r˜)
βλ0
. (6.1)
First, fix λ0 and consider the function µ 7→ b∗. Differentiating the equation (3.11) and then
again using (3.11) to eliminate µ, we obtain
∂q∗
∂µ
= − q∗1
2
σ2(2q∗ − 1) + µ = −
q2∗
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r˜
< 0. (6.2)
Hence, using (6.1) and (6.2),
db∗
dµ
=
∂b∗
∂µ
+
∂b∗
∂q∗
· ∂q∗
∂µ
= − P (
1
2
σ2q2∗)
βλ0 (
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r˜)
< 0, (6.3)
and, therefore, b∗ is a decreasing function of µ (see Fig. 4(a)).
Similarly, the equation (3.11) yields
∂q∗
∂λ0
=
1
1
2
σ2(2q∗ − 1) + µ =
q∗
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r + λ0
> 0. (6.4)
From (6.1) and (6.4), after some rearrangements we obtain
db∗
dλ0
=
∂b∗
∂λ0
+
∂b∗
∂q∗
· ∂q∗
∂λ0
= −P (
1
2
σ2q∗+ r)
βλ20
+
P (1
2
σ2q∗)
βλ0 (
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r + λ0)
= −P
[
(1
2
σ2q∗+ r)(12σ
2q2∗ + r) + λ0r
]
βλ20 (
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r + λ0)
< 0, (6.5)
and it follows that the function λ0 7→ b∗ is decreasing (see Fig. 4(b)).
Let us now turn to the value function v = v(x). First, consider v as a function of
µ, thus keeping λ0 fixed. Using the expression (2.23), we can rewrite the first line of the
formula (2.25) (i.e., for x ≤ b∗) as
v =
P
q∗ − 1
( x
b∗
)q∗
. (6.6)
Differentiating (6.6), we get
∂v
∂q∗
= − P
(q∗ − 1)2
( x
b∗
)q∗ (
1 + (q∗ − 1) ln
(
b∗
x
))
< 0, (6.7)
∂v
∂b∗
= − P q∗
(q∗ − 1)b∗
( x
b∗
)q∗
< 0. (6.8)
Hence, on account of the inequalities (6.2), (6.4), (6.7) and (6.8),
dv
dµ
=
∂v
∂µ
+
∂v
∂q∗
· ∂q∗
∂µ
+
∂v
∂b∗
· db
∗
dµ
> 0. (6.9)
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Fig. 4: Graphs illustrating parametric dependencies of the optimal threshold (2.23): (a) on
the wage drift µ < r˜ and (b) on the unemployment rate λ0 > 0 ∨ (µ − r), for selected
values of λ0 and µ, respectively. The values of other model parameters used throughout are
as in Example 5.2: r = 0.0004, P = 9 000, β = 30, and σ = 0.02. The dashed horizontal
line in both plots indicates the initial wage x = 346. The dashed vertical line in (a)
indicates µ = r. The lower dashed horizontal line in (b) shows the asymptote P/β = 300
(see (6.19)).
If x ≥ b∗, then from the second line of (2.25) we readily obtain
dv
dµ
=
βλ0x
(r˜ − µ)2 > 0. (6.10)
Thus, in all cases dv/dµ > 0, which implies that the function µ 7→ v is increasing (see
Fig. 5(a)).
Finally, fix µ and consider the function λ0 7→ v. If x ≥ b∗ then v is given by the second
line of (2.25), that is,
v =
βλ0x
λ0 + r − µ − P. (6.11)
In particular, if µ = r then (6.11) is reduced to v ≡ v∗ := βx− P . From (6.11) it follows
that
dv
dλ0
=
βx(r − µ)
(λ0 + r − µ)2

< 0, µ > r,
= 0, µ = r,
> 0, µ < r.
Due to monotonicity of the function λ0 7→ b∗ (see (6.5)), v is given by (6.11) as long as
λ0 ≥ λ∗, for some critical value λ∗ ≡ λ∗(µ) ≤ ∞. It will be shown below (see (6.19)) that
limλ0→∞ b∗ = P/β, so λ∗ < ∞ if and only x > P/β. Clearly, λ∗ is determined by the
condition b∗ = x (see (2.23)) together with the equation (3.11). In the special case µ = r
(assuming that x > P/β), these equations can be solved to yield
λ∗ =
P
βx
( 1
2
σ2βx
βx− P + r
)
. (6.12)
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Fig. 5: Graphs illustrating parametric dependencies of the value function (2.25): (a) on the
wage drift µ < r˜ and (b) on the unemployment rate λ0 > 0 ∨ (µ − r), for selected values
of λ0 and µ, respectively. The values of other model parameters used throughout are as
in Example 5.2: r = 0.0004, P = 9 000, β = 30, σ = 0.02, and x = 346. The dashed
horizontal lines in both plots correspond to the value v∗ := βx − P = 1380. The dashed
vertical line in (a) indicates µ = r; in this case, shown as curve ii in plot (b), v(x) ≡ v∗
for all λ0 ≥ λ∗ .= 0.012420 (see (6.12)). That is why curves iii, iv and v in plot (a) all
intersect at µ = r.
In particular, in Example 5.2 this gives λ∗
.
= 0.012420. From the consideration above, it
also follows that if x > P/β then (see (6.11))
lim
λ0→∞
v = v∗ = βx− P. (6.13)
In the case x ≤ b∗, we use formula (6.6). Similarly to (6.9),
dv
dλ0
=
∂v
∂λ0
+
∂v
∂q∗
· ∂q∗
∂λ0
+
∂v
∂b∗
· db
∗
dλ0
. (6.14)
Substituting the expressions (6.2), (6.4), (6.7) and (6.8) into (6.14), cancelling immaterial
factors and recalling formula (6.1), the condition dv/dλ0 < 0 is reduced to(
1
2
σ2q∗ + r
)(
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r
)
+ λ0r <
(
1
q∗ − 1 + ln
(
b∗
x
))(
1
2
σ2q2∗ + r + λ0
)
. (6.15)
It can be proved that if µ ≥ r then the inequality (6.15) holds for all λ0 < λ∗, but
the analysis becomes difficult for µ < r. Numerical plots (see Fig. 5(b)) suggest that in
the latter case the function λ0 7→ v may be non-monotonic, with the derivative dv/dλ0
possibly vanishing in up to two points, provided that r − ε < µ < r with ε > 0 small
enough. To be more specific, the plots in Fig. 5(b) illustrate the case x > P/β, with the
common asymptote (6.13). For x ≤ P/β, the plots look similar (not shown here) but with
limλ0→∞ v = 0 (see (6.22) below), so the derivative dv/dλ0 may vanish in at most one
point.
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6.2. Limiting values
Let us investigate the functions b∗ and v in the limits (i) µ → −∞ or µ ↑ r˜, and (ii)
λ0 →∞ or λ0 ↓ 0 (µ < r), λ0 ↓ µ− r (µ ≥ r). Start by observing, using equation (3.11),
that
lim
µ→−∞
q∗ =∞, lim
µ↑ r˜
q∗ = 1, (6.16)
and moreover,
q∗ − 1 ∼ r˜ − µ1
2
σ2+ r˜
(µ ↑ r˜). (6.17)
Similarly, limλ0→∞ q∗ = ∞; on the other hand, if µ < r then limλ0↓0 q∗ = q∗|λ0=0 > 1,
while if µ ≥ r then
q∗ − 1 ∼ λ0 − (µ− r)1
2
σ2+ µ
(λ0 ↓ µ− r). (6.18)
Hence, from (6.1) and (6.16) it readily follows that b∗ →∞ (µ→ −∞) and
b∗ → P (
1
2
σ2+ r˜)
βλ0
(µ ↑ r˜).
Also, using that q∗ →∞ (λ0 →∞), from (2.23) we get
b∗ → P
β
(λ0 →∞). (6.19)
In the opposite limit, if µ > r then, according to (6.1) and (6.18),
b∗ → P (
1
2
σ2+ µ)
β(µ− r) (λ0 ↓ µ− r), (6.20)
while if µ ≤ r then limλ0↓0 b∗ =∞; in particular, for µ = r
b∗ ∼ P (
1
2
σ2 + r)
βλ0
(λ0 ↓ 0). (6.21)
For the value function v = v(x), from formula (6.6) we get, using (6.16) and (6.17),
lim
µ→−∞
v = 0, lim
µ↑ r˜
v =∞.
Furthermore, according to (6.13), if x > P/β then v → v∗ = βx − P as λ0 → ∞.
In the opposite case, due to monotonicity of b∗ (see (6.5)) and the limit (6.19) we have
b∗ > P/β ≥ x, so using formula (6.6) and recalling that q∗ →∞, we get
v ≤ P
q∗ − 1 → 0 (λ0 →∞). (6.22)
Now, consider the limit of v as λ0 approaches the lower edge of its range. If µ < r then
(6.6) implies that limλ↓0 v = 0, since b∗ →∞ and q∗ → q∗|λ0=0 > 1. If µ = r then, using
(6.18) and (6.21) (with µ = r), we obtain
v ∼ βxλq∗−10 = βx exp
{
(q∗ − 1) lnλ0
}→ βx (λ0 ↓ 0). (6.23)
Finally, if µ > r then from (6.6) it readily follows, according to (6.18) and (6.20),
v ∼ βx(µ− r)
λ− (µ− r) →∞ (λ0 ↓ µ− r). (6.24)
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Fig. 6: Isolines (level curves) of the optimal stopping problem solution on the (λ0, µ)-
plane: (a) b∗(λ0, µ) = const (optimal threshold (2.23)); (b) v(λ0, µ) = const (value
function (2.25)). The values of other parameters used throughout are as in Example 5.2:
r = 0.0004, P = 9 000, β = 30, σ = 0.02, and x = 346. The slanted dashed lines in both
plots show the boundary µ = λ0 + r (see (2.11)). In plot (b), the horizontal dashed line
indicates µ = r and the vertical dashed line shows λ∗
.
= 0.012420 (cf. Fig. 5(b)).
6.3. Comparative statics and sensitivity analysis
The goal of comparative statics is to understand how varying values of exogenous parameters
affect a target function of interest. For instance, consider the optimal threshold b∗ as a
function of both unemployment rate λ0 and wage drift µ. Rather then fixing one of these
parameters and then plotting b∗ against the remaining parameter (as was done in Figs. 4(a)
and 4(b)), it is useful to plot a family of comparative statics plots showing the isolines
(or level curves) for different values (levels) of the function, that is, b∗(λ0, µ) = const
(see Fig. 6(a)). As may be expected from Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), the plots of the function
λ0 = λ0(µ) (determined implicitly by the level condition) behave as monotone decreasing
graphs. Analogous plots for the value function are presented in Fig. 6(b); the plots become
non-monotonic for v large enough. If λ0 is fixed then the value v grows with µ, in agreement
with (6.9) and (6.10). Similarly, if µ > r is fixed then v decreases with λ0, converging
to the limit v∗ = βx − P as λ0 → ∞ (see (6.13)), represented by curve II in Fig. 5(b).
If v > v∗ then there are up to two different values of λ0 (and common µ) producing the
same value v, while for v smaller than but close enough to v∗, the number of such roots
may increase to three (see the discussion in Section 6.4).
Let us also comment on the sensitivity of our numerical examples presented in Sec-
tion 5.4. The question here is, how much the output values (say, the optimal threshold
b∗ and the value v) would change under a small variation of one of the background pa-
rameters. In the linear approximation, the change factor is given by the corresponding
partial derivative. As in the previous sections, we address the sensitivity with regard to the
wage drift µ (around the set value µ = 0.0004) and the unemployment rate λ0 (around
λ0 = 0.01). Other model parameters are fixed as in Section 5.4, that is, r = 0.0004,
P = 9 000, β = 30, and x = 346. As for the volatility parameter σ, it is set to be σ = 0.04
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as in Example 5.1 or σ = 0.02 as in Example 5.2. The required partial derivatives of b∗ and
v can be computed using the formulas derived in Section 6.1; the results are presented in
Table 1(a).
Table 1: Sensitivity check of numerical results for the functions b∗ and v in Examples 5.1
and 5.2: (a) parametric derivatives; (b) increments in response to a 1%-change in the
background parameters.
(a) Derivatives
Derivative Example 5.1 Example 5.2
db∗/dµ −16 037.57 −13 962.43
dv/dµ 842 062.30 993 991.20
db∗/dλ0 −6 323.813 −3161.906
dv/dλ0 −46 485.530 −8768.435
(b) Increments (euro)
Increment Example 5.1 Example 5.2
∆b∗ (µ) −0.06415 −0.05585
∆v (µ) 3.36825 3.97597
∆b∗ (λ0) −0.63238 −0.31619
∆v (λ0) −4.64855 −0.87684
Numerical values in Table 1(a) may seem quite big, but they should be offset by small
background values of the parameters, µ = 0.0004 and λ0 = 0.01. If we increase them by
a small amount, say by 1%, then the absolute increments would be
∆µ = 0.0004/100 = 4 · 10−6, ∆λ0 = 0.01/100 = 10−4.
Hence, using Table 1(a), we obtain the corresponding approximate increments of the target
functions b∗ and v (see Table 1(b)), which look more palatable. One interesting observation
is that the value v reacts about 5 times stronger to the change of the unemployment rate
λ0 when the volatility σ gets 2 times bigger (from σ = 0.02 in Example 5.2 to σ = 0.04 in
Example 5.1); in contrast, the change of v in response to an increase of the wage drift is
much less pronounced. This highlights the primary significance of the unemployment rate,
which is of course only natural.
Sensitivity analysis with regard to the wage drift µ is also useful in the light of the
difficulty in estimation of µ from the data, mentioned in Section 5.2. The results in
Table 1(b) suggest that a reasonably small error in selecting µ has only a minor effect on
the identification of the optimal threshold b∗ and the value v; for instance, overestimating
it by 1% will decrease b∗ by just 0.01 euro, while the value v will be up by about 0.60
euro. Thus, an individual using a moderately inflated value of their wage rate would take
a slightly over-optimistic view about the timing of joining the insurance scheme and its
expected benefit. On the other hand, a risk-averse individual may take a more conservative
view and prefer to underestimate their wage drift µ, which will raise the threshold b∗ resulting
in a longer waiting time. For the insurance company though, it may be reasonable to try
and avoid underestimation of the wage drift of potential customers, so as to reduce the
risk of overpaying the benefits.
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6.4. Economic interpretation
Monotonic decay of the optimal threshold b∗ with an increase of the unemployment rate
λ0 (see (6.5) and Fig. 4(b)) has a clear economic appeal: a bigger unemployment rate λ0
means a higher risk of losing the job, which demands a lower target threshold b∗ in order
to expedite joining the insurance scheme. The economic rationale for the monotonicity of
b∗ as a function of µ (see (6.3) and Fig. 4(a)) is different—a bigger wage drift µ makes
it more likely to reach a higher final wage Xτ0 by the time of loss of job, so lowering the
threshold b∗ adds incentive to an earlier entry.
Monotonic growth of the value v as a function of the wage drift µ (see (6.9), (6.10),
and Fig. 5(a)) is also meaningful— indeed, when the wage drift µ gets bigger, there is more
potential to reach a higher final wage Xτ0 by the time of loss of job, which increases the
expected benefit β1 (see (2.9)) and, therefore, the value v = v(x) of the insurance policy.
The behaviour of the value function v = v(x) in response to a varying unemployment
rate λ0 is more interesting, as indicated by the plots in Fig. 5(b). In the case µ < r, it is
satisfactory to see that the value v, vanishing in the limit as λ0 ↓ 0, starts growing with
λ0, thus reflecting a good efficiency of the insurance policy against an increasing risk of
unemployment. On the other side of the policy, this may present a growing risk for the
insurance company which will have to finance an increasing number of claims. But with
the unemployment rate λ0 getting ever bigger, the value v should stay bounded, so must
converge to a limit as λ0 →∞, given by v∗ = βx− P if x > P/β (see (6.13)) or v∗ = 0
otherwise (see (6.22)). In particular, Fig. 5(b) shows that, for a certain range of µ, the
value v achieves its maximum at some λ0. However, the graphs also reveal that if µ keeps
increasing then the value plots may have a more complicated non-monotonic behaviour,
which is harder to interpret economically.
On the other hand, as is evident from Fig. 5(b), in the case µ ≥ r our model produces
a counter-intuitive increase of the value v as λ0 approaches the left edge of its range— it
is hard to believe that the value may grow as the risk of unemployment falls. Moreover,
as was computed in (6.24), for µ > r the corresponding limit of v is infinite! But perhaps
the most striking example emerges in the borderline case µ = r, whereby formally setting
λ0 = 0 we would get, according to (6.21), that the threshold b
∗ is infinite (unlike the case
µ > r, see (6.21)), so that the wage process (Xt) never reaches it; therefore, we never
buy the insurance policy (understandably so, as there is no risk of losing the job), and
nonetheless its value is positive in this limit (see (6.13)). The explanation of this paradox
lies in the way how the optimal stopping is exercised for small λ0 > 0: here, the threshold b
∗
is high and there is only a very small probability that it is ever reached; before this happens,
we stay idle, but if and when the threshold is hit then the expected payoff is rather big,
which contributes enough to the expected net present value to keep it positive in the limit
λ0 ↓ 0 (see (6.23)).
Thus, the artefacts in our model as indicated above are caused by not putting any
constraint on the waiting times. This can be rectified, for example, by introducing mortality,
as was sketched in Section 2.3; in particular, such a regularization should restore a zero
limit of v at the lower edge of λ0.
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7. Including utility considerations
7.1. Perpetual American call option
Our model (and its solution) resembles that of the optimal stopping problem for the (perpet-
ual) American call option (see a detailed discussion in [39, Ch. VIII, §2a]). More specifically,
the holder of a call option may exercise the right to buy an asset (e.g., one unit of stock) at
any time for a pre-determined strike price K, where the decision is based on observations
over the random process of stock prices (St), assumed to follow a geometric Brownian
motion model. The term perpetual is used to indicate that there is no expiration date, so
the right to buy extends indefinitely.
The optimal time instant τ = τ ∗ to buy, bearing in mind a purely financial target of
maximizing the profit Sτ −K, is the solution of the following optimal stopping problem,
V (x) = sup
τ
Ex
(
e−rτ (Sτ −K)+
)
, (7.1)
where St is a geometric Brownian motion with parameters µ < r and σ > 0, the supremum
is taken over all stopping times τ adapted to the filtration associated with (St). The positive
truncation (·)+ corresponds to the constraint that the option holder is not in a position
to buy at the price K higher than the current spot price St. The solution to (7.1) is well
known (see, e.g., [39, Ch. VIII, §2a]) to be given by the hitting time τ ∗ = τb∗ , with the
optimal threshold
b∗ =
Kq∗
q∗ − 1 ,
where q∗ is given by formula (2.24) but with r˜ = r + λ0 replaced by r. The corresponding
value function is given by
V (x) =
(b∗ −K)
( x
b∗
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b∗],
x−K, x ∈ [b∗,∞).
Observe that our optimal stopping problem (2.17) can be rewritten as
v(x) = β1 sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τ (Xτ − K˜)
]
, K˜ := P/β1, (7.2)
which makes it look very similar to the perpetual American call option problem (7.1).
However, there are several important differences. Firstly, unlike the gain function in the
American call option problem (7.1), no truncation is applied in (7.2), because the financial
gain is not the sole priority in this context and therefore the individual is prepared to tolerate
negative values of β1Xτ − P (despite the fact that, under the optimal strategy, the value
function v(x) is always non-negative, see Lemma 2.2(i) and formula (2.25)).5 In addition,
as was mentioned in Remark 4.1 and in Section 5.3, the hitting time τb∗ may be infinite
with a positive probability (i.e., when µ < 1
2
σ2), which may be deemed impractical in the
insurance context, but is considered to be acceptable for exercising the American call option.
This simple observation helps to realize the fundamental conceptual difference between the
5The equivalence of the problems (7.1) and (7.2), which we have established directly, is not a coinci-
dence: it is known [41, Proposition 3.1, p.185] that, under mild assumptions, the solution of the general
optimal stopping problem v(x) = supτ Ex(e
−rτg(Xτ )) does not change with the positive truncation of
g(·).
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two problems; indeed, the insurance optimal stopping does not focus only on the financial
gain, but also places an ultimate priority on acquiring an insurance cover per se. Hence, a
more realistic formulation of the optimal stopping problem in the UI model should involve
a certain utility, which specifies the individual’s weighted preferences for satisfaction— for
example, impatience against waiting for too long before joining the UI scheme.
7.2. Heuristic optimal stopping models with utility
Here, we present a few informal thoughts about the possible inclusion of utility in the
optimality analysis. As already mentioned, in the case µ < 1
2
σ2 the probability of hitting
the critical threshold b∗ is less than 1, so there is a probability that the individual will never
join the insurance scheme if the optimal stopping rule is strictly followed. This is of course
not desirable, as the individual puts high priority on getting insured at some point in time
(hopefully, prior to loss of job).
One simple way to take these additional requirements into account is to extend the
optimal stopping problem (2.17) as follows:
v†(x) = sup
τ
[
κPx(τ <∞) + eNPV(x; τ)
]
= sup
τ
Ex
[
κ1{τ<∞}+ e
−r˜τg(Xτ)
]
, (7.3)
where the supremum is again taken over all stopping times τ adapted to the process (Xt),
and the coefficient κ ≥ 0 is a predefined weight representing the individual’s personal
attitude (preference) towards the two contributing terms. If Px(τ <∞) = 1 then the first
term in (7.3) is reduced to a constant (κ), leading to a pure optimal stopping problem
as before; however, if Px(τ < ∞) < 1 then the first term enhances the role of candidate
stopping times τ that are less likely to be infinite.
The problem (7.3) can be rewritten in a more standard form by pulling out the common
discounting factor under expectation,
v†(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τG(τ,Xτ)
]
, (7.4)
with
G(t, x) := κ e r˜ t+ g(x), (t, x) ∈ [0,∞]× [0,∞). (7.5)
Unfortunately, the optimal stopping problem (7.4) is not amenable to an exact solution as
before, because the gain function (7.5) depends also on the time variable (see [35, Ch. IV]).
In this case, the problem (7.4) may again be reduced to a suitable (but more complex)
free-boundary problem, but the hitting boundary (of a certain set on the (t, x)-plane) is no
longer a straight line.
More generally, our optimal stopping problem can be modified by replacing the indicator
in (7.3) with the expression e−ρτ (ρ > 0),
v†(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
κe−ρτ + e−r˜τg(Xτ )
]
, (7.6)
which retains the flavour of progressively penalizing larger values of τ , including τ = ∞.
Here, the gain function (7.5) takes the form
G(t, x) = κ e(r˜−ρ)t+ g(x).
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In particular, by choosing ρ = r˜ the problem (7.6) is transformed into
v† = sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τ (β1Xτ + κ− P )
]
,
which is the same problem as (2.17) but with the premium P replaced by P − κ.
Another, more drastic approach to amending the standard optimal stopping problem
(2.17) stems from the observation that even if τ < ∞ (Px-a.s.), it may take long to wait
for τ to happen— for instance, if Ex(τ) =∞. In other words, it is reasonable to take into
account the expected value of τ , leading to the combined optimal stopping problem
v†(x) = sup
τ
[
κPx(τ <∞) + κ exp{−Ex(τ)}+ eNPV(x; τ)
]
. (7.7)
If Px(τ < ∞) < 1 then Ex(τ) = ∞ and the problem (7.7) is reduced to (7.3), whereas
if Px(τ < ∞) = 1 then, effectively, only the term with the expectation remains in (7.7).
However, a disadvantage of the formulation (7.7) is that it cannot be expressed in the
form (7.4). Trying to amend this would take us back to the version (7.6).
It is interesting to look at how the value function depends on the preference parameter κ.
The next property is intuitively obvious.
Proposition 7.1. For each x > 0, the value function v†(x) of the optimal stopping problem
(7.6) is a strictly increasing function of κ. The same is true for the problem (7.7).
Proof. We use the notation v†(x; κ) to indicate the dependence of the value function on
the parameter κ. For κ1 < κ2 and any stopping time τ 6≡ ∞, we have
Ex
[
κ1 e
−ρτ + e−r˜τg(Xτ )
]
< Ex
[
κ2 e
−ρτ + e−r˜τg(Xτ)
] ≤ v†(x; κ2). (7.8)
Suppose that τ∗ is a maximizer for the optimal stopping problem (7.6) with κ = κ1. Then,
according to (7.8),
v†(x; κ1) = Ex
[
κ1 e
−ρτ∗+ e−r˜τ∗g(Xτ∗)
]
< v†(x; κ2),
that is, v†(x; κ1) < v†(x; κ2) as claimed. Similar arguments apply to the problem (7.7).
7.3. Sub-optimal solutions
As already mentioned, the optimal stopping problems outlined in Section 6.2 are difficult
to solve in full generality. To gain some insight about the qualitative effects of the added
utility-type terms, it may be reasonable to restrict our attention to solutions in the subclass
of hitting times τb. Despite such solutions will only be suboptimal, the advantage is that
the reduced problems can be solved using that all the ingredients are available explicitly
(see Section 4.1).
For example, the original problem (7.3) is replaced by
u†(x) = sup
b≥0
[
κPx(τb <∞) + eNPV(x; τb)
]
. (7.9)
Similarly as in Section 4.3, we only need to maximize the functional in (7.9) over b ≥ x.
Indeed, if b ≤ x then τb = 0 (Px-a.s.) and, according to (2.7) and (2.16),
sup
b≤x
[
κPx(τb <∞) + eNPV(x; τb)
]
= κ+ eNPV(x; 0) = κ+ β1x− P,
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whereas
sup
b≥x
[
κPx(τb <∞) + eNPV(x; τb)
] ≥ [κPx(τb <∞) + eNPV(x; τb)]∣∣b=x
= κ+ β1x− P.
Assume that µ − 1
2
σ2 < 0 (for otherwise Px(τb < ∞) = 1, thus leading to the same
optimal stopping problem as before). Then, according to (4.8), the probability Px(τb <∞)
becomes a strictly decreasing function of b ∈ [x,∞), and so the maximum in (7.9) is
achieved by a different stopping strategy, with a lower optimal threshold b†. More precisely,
by virtue of formulas (4.8) and (4.15), the problem (7.9) is explicitly rewritten as
u†(x) = sup
b≥x
[
κ
(x
b
)1−2µ/σ2
+ (β1b− P )
(x
b
)q∗]
, (7.10)
where q∗ > 1 is defined in (2.24). Differentiating with respect to b, it is easy to check that
the maximizer for the problem (7.10) is given by
b† = min
{
b ≥ x : aκ
(
b
x
)q∗−a
+ (q∗ − 1)β1b ≥ Pq∗
}
,
where a := 1− 2µ/σ2 < 1 < q∗.
The following (slightly artificial) version of the utility keeps the spirit of (7.9) but is
amenable to the exact analysis:
u†(x) = sup
b≥0
[
κ
{
Px(τb <∞)
}q∗/(1−2µ/σ2)
+ eNPV(x; τb)
]
. (7.11)
Indeed, using the same substitutions (4.8) and (4.15) as before, (7.11) is reduced to
(cf. (7.10))
u†(x) = sup
b≥x
[
(β1b+ κ− P )
(x
b
)q∗]
, (7.12)
which is the same problem as (4.14) but with P replaced by P −κ (cf. (4.15)). Therefore,
from (4.16) we immediately obtain the maximizer
b† =
(P − κ)q∗
β1(q∗ − 1) = b
∗− κq∗
β1(q∗ − 1) ≤ b
∗. (7.13)
This is a strictly decreasing (linear) function of κ; in particular, b† = b∗ if κ = 0 and b† = 0
if κ = P . The corresponding value function is given by (cf. (4.17))
u†(x) =
{
(β1b
† + κ− P )
( x
b†
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b†],
β1x+ κ− P, x ∈ [b†,∞),
(7.14)
or more explicitly (cf. (4.18))
u†(x) =

P − κ
q∗ − 1
(
β1(q∗ − 1)x
(P − κ)q∗
)q∗
, 0 ≤ x ≤ (P − κ)q∗
β1(q∗ − 1) ,
β1x+ κ− P, x ≥ (P − κ)q∗
β1(q∗ − 1) .
(7.15)
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Fig. 7: Functional dependence on the preference weight κ in the reduced optimal stopping
problem (7.11): (a) the optimal threshold b† (see (7.13)); (b) the value function u†(x)
(see (7.15)). Numerical values of the parameters used are as in Example 5.2: r = µ =
0.0004, P = 9 000, β = 30, σ = 0.02, and x = 346. In particular, if κ = 0 then
b† coincides with b∗ .= 352.3705 and u†(x) coincides with v(x) .= 1389.6190. The dashed
vertical lines on both plots indicate the value κ† .= 162.7108 (see (7.16)) separating different
regimes for u†(x) according to (7.15). When κ = κ†, we have b† = x = 346, shown as
a dashed horizontal line in plot (a); the corresponding value function is given by u†(x) =
β1x + κ
† − P .= 1542.7110 (see (7.14)), shown as a dashed horizontal line in plot (b).
Note that the graph of u†(x) in plot (b) looks almost linear for κ ∈ [0, κ†], because the
ratio κ/P is quite small, 0 ≤ κ/P ≤ κ†/P .= 0.01808; the slope here is approximately
v(x)(q∗ − 1)/P .= 0.88448, as compared to slope 1 of the linear graph for κ ≥ κ†.
If x is fixed then the problem value u†, as a function of κ, is given by the first or the second
line in (7.15) according as κ ∈ [0, κ†] or κ ∈ [κ†,∞), respectively, where
κ† := P − β1(q∗ − 1)x
q∗
. (7.16)
The dependence of b† and u†(x) upon the utility parameter κ ∈ [0, P ] is illustrated
in Fig. 7, while Fig. 8 demonstrates the functional dependence of the hitting probability
Px(τb < ∞) and the mean hitting time Ex(τb) upon the variable threshold b ≥ 0, along
with the corresponding plots of the expected net present value eNPV(x; τb).
Remark 7.1. Note that u†(x) is a strictly increasing function of κ ∈ [0, P ], in accord with
Proposition 7.1. In particular, u†(x) coincides with the original value function u(x) given
by (4.18), but with the premium P replaced by P − κ. This can be interpreted as the
individual’s consent to convert additional satisfaction, gained by virtue of pursuing the
optimal stopping problem (7.11) instead of (2.17), into a higher premium, P † = P + κ.
Such an effect is characteristic of the use of risk-averse utility functions under the Expected
Utility Theory [23] (see also a discussion below in Section 6.4).
In the case µ > 1
2
σ2, instead of (7.7) we may consider the simplified problem
u†(x) = sup
b≥0
[
κ exp{−Ex(τb)}+ eNPV(x; τb)
]
. (7.17)
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Fig. 8: Theoretical graphs for functionals of the hitting time τb versus threshold b ≥ 0.
Upper row: (a) the hitting probability Px(τb < ∞) (see (4.8)); (b) the mean hitting time
Ex(τb) (see (4.9)). Bottom row: the expected net present value eNPV(x; τb) (see (4.15))
with µ < 1
2
σ2 (c) or µ > 1
2
σ2 (d). The values of parameters used throughout are as in
Section 5.4: x = 346, P = 9 000, β1 = 30, µ = 0.0004, and σ = 0.04 (left) or σ = 0.02
(right). The dashed vertical lines on each plot indicate x and the optimal threshold b∗,
respectively; specifically, b∗ .= 404.7410 on the left (see Example 5.1) and b∗ .= 352.3705
on the right (see Example 5.2).
Upon the substitution of formulas (4.9) and (4.15), it is rewritten in the form (cf. (7.10))
u†(x) = sup
b≥x
[
κ
ln(b/x)
µ− 1
2
σ2
+ (β1b− P )
(x
b
)q∗]
. (7.18)
Again, the maximization problem (7.18) can be solved (at least, numerically). For an
analytic solution, it is convenient to modify the problem (7.17) as follows,
u†(x) = sup
b≥0
[
κ exp
(
− q∗
µ− 1
2
σ2
Ex(τb)
)
+ eNPV(x; τb)
]
.
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Similarly to (7.18), this leads to the maximization problem that coincides with (7.12) and,
therefore, has the same solution (7.13) and (7.14) (or, equivalently, (7.15)).
7.4. Connections to Expected Utility Theory
The considerations above can be linked to the standard Expected Utility Theory [23]. In
the usual setting, it is assumed that an individual uses (perhaps, subconsciously) a certain
utility U(w), as a function of financial wealth w, to assess losses, gains and the resulting
satisfaction. Generically, given the current wealth w and some random future loss Y , the
expected loss (measured via utility U(·)) may be expressed as E[U(w−Y )]. The individual
is inclined to pay a premium P and buy the insurance policy as long as the expected utility
without insurance is no more than U(w − P ),
E
[
U(w − Y )] ≤ U(w − P ). (7.19)
The balance condition
E
[
U(w − Y )] = U(w − P ) (7.20)
determines the maximum premium Pmax the customer is prepared to pay (in fact, at this
point it makes no difference whether to buy the insurance or not).
In the baseline case with U(w) ≡ w, the conditions (7.19) and (7.20) are reduced to
P ≤ Pmax = E(Y ). (7.21)
However, choosing a different utility function may well change this threshold. For instance,
if the random loss Y has exponential distribution with parameter θ = 0.001, then according
to (7.21) we have Pmax = E(Y ) = 1/θ = 1000. In contrast, let the utility function be
chosen as U(w) = 1− exp(−1
2
θw
)
. Here, the utility is between 0 and 1 if the wealth w is
positive, but it becomes increasingly negative for a negative wealth; that is, strong weight
is placed against negative wealth, which may be characteristic of a risk-averse individual.
In this case, it is easy to check that
Pmax =
2 ln 2
θ
= 1386.294 > 1000.
Thus, the individual is happy to pay more than before to protect themselves from the
perceived risk of significant losses. That is to say, an additional amount of satisfaction is
convertible into an extra premium.
In our case, if the UI was to be entered immediately, at time t = 0, then the value of
this decision would be eNPV(x; 0) = β1x− P (see (2.8) and (2.16)). Clearly, in order for
this to be non-negative, the premium P must satisfy the condition
P ≤ Pmax = β1x.
For instance, in the setting of the numerical example in Section 5.4, we get Pmax =
30× 346 = 10 380, while the set premium is P = 9 000.
Similarly, if the decision was taken at a stopping time τ , then, conditional on the wage
Xτ , the maximum premium payable would be given by Pmax = β1Xτ . Thus, the value of
Pmax goes up or down together with the current wage. However, in our setting the entry
time is not decided in advance, being subject to the stopping rule based on observations
over (Xt). As a result, the value function v(x) (x > 0) of the optimal stopping problem is
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always positive for any premium P , no matter how high (see formula (2.26)). Apparently,
this is manufactured by selecting the threshold b∗ high enough, which guarantees that, in
the (rare) event of hitting it, the mean value of this strategy will be positive.
This may not be satisfactory from the standpoint of the Expected Utility Theory; how-
ever, there is no contradiction, because in its standard version this theory does not allow
for an optional stopping. Adding utility terms to the gain function in the spirit of Sections
6.2 and 6.3 helps to amend the situation (see Remark 7.1), but the maximum premium
payable still remains indeterminate.
The explanation of this paradox lies in the simple fact that the gain function in the
optimal stopping problems considered so far does not include any losses. A simple way
to account for such losses is to include consumption in the model. Namely, suppose for
simplicity that the consumption rate c is constant; for instance, the net present value of
consumption over time interval [0, t] is given by∫ t
0
e−rsc ds =
c(1− e−rt)
r
.
It is natural to assume that the wage Xt is sufficient to finance the consumption, so that
Ex(Xt) = xe
µt ≥ c for all t ≥ 0 (see (2.3)). In turn, for this to hold it suffices to assume
that X0 = x ≥ c and µ ≥ 0. Hence, we need to take into account consumption only over
the unemployment spell [τ0, τ0 + τ1], where the wage is replaced by the UI benefit. The
expected net present value of this consumption is given by
γ := E
(
e−rτ0
∫ τ1
0
e−rsc ds
)
= E
(
e−rτ0
) · E(c(1− e−rτ1)
r
)
=
λ0c
(r + λ0)(r + ∗λ1) ,
using independence of τ0 and τ1 and their exponential distributions (with parameters λ0
and λ1, respectively). Thus, our basic optimal stopping problem (2.17) is modified to
v‡(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
e−r˜τg(Xτ)− γ
]
,
which has the same solution as before (see Section 2.5) but with the new value function
v‡(x) = v(x)− γ, that is (cf. (2.25)),
v‡(x) =
{
(β1b
∗ − P )
( x
b∗
)q∗− γ, x ∈ [0, b∗],
β1x− P − γ, x ∈ [b∗,∞).
Now, the inequality v‡(x) ≥ 0 can be easily solved for P to yield
P ≤ P ‡max :=
β1b∗ − γ
(
b∗
x
)q∗
, x ∈ [0, b∗],
β1x− γ, x ∈ [b∗,∞).
(7.22)
Note that P ‡max in (7.22) is a decreasing function of γ, but an increasing function of x.
Thus, as could be expected, the maximum affordable premium gets lower with the increase
of consumption, but becomes higher with the increase of the wage.
Remark 7.2. Of course, consumption can also be incorporated into the optimal stopping
models involving utility (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3), but we omit technical details.
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8. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have set up and solved an optimal stopping problem in a stylized UI model.
The model and its solution are useful by illustrating approaches to optimal strategy of an
individual seeking to get insured. By including consumption in the model, we have also
demonstrated how a fair premium can be calculated, which makes our UI model usable also
from the insurer’s perspective.
An explicit closed-form solution of the corresponding optimal stopping problem was
possible due to some simplifying assumptions— in particular, exponential distribution of
time τ0 to loss of job and constant inflation rate r. The analysis also strongly relied on
the simplest model for the wage process (Xt), that is, geometric Brownian motion with
constant drift µ and volatility σ2.
Let us indicate a few directions of making our UI model more realistic. Firstly, indefinite
term of UI insurance could be replaced by a finite expiration term for the benefit schedule
(akin to American call option with finite horizon), which would lead to a harder (time-
dependent) optimal stopping problem (cf. [35, §25.2]). Also, the assumption of exponential
distribution of τ0 needs to be tested on the basis of real unemployment data. Note, however,
that fitting a different distribution for τ0 will invalidate the expression (2.13) for the expected
net present value eNPV(x; τ) and, therefore, will change the gain function in the optimal
stopping problem (2.17), making it more difficult to solve.
The parameters of the model may also need to be made time-dependent, causing obvious
complications to the model. On the other hand, the implicit assumption of passive waiting
for a new job during the unemployment spell may not be realistic, or at least not desirable
as individuals would rather be expected to seek jobs more pro-actively. Thus, it may be
interesting to combine our UI model with job-seeking models such as in [4].
The inclusion of utility terms in the optimal setting is novel in this context, and illumi-
nates significant changes in the individual’s behaviour when driven by utility considerations.
In particular, the value of the optimal stopping problem (7.6) is an increasing function of
the preference coefficient κ (see Proposition 7.1). This result is intuitively appealing, as
it conforms with the usual impact of utility function (under the Expected Utility Theory),
allowing one to convert extra satisfaction into extra premium. This is confirmed by our
analysis of suboptimal solutions in Section 6.3 (see Fig. 7). Finally, it would be interesting
to study the optimal stopping problem (7.6) in more detail.
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